CSE 410/565: Computer Security

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Symmetric Encryption II

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Confusion-diffusion paradigm
  - split a block into small chunks
  - define a substitution on each chunk separately (confusion)
  - mix outputs from different chunks by rearranging bits (diffusion)
  - repeat to strengthen the result

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- For this type of algorithm to be reversible, each operation needs to be invertible

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Let's denote one iteration or round by function g

  - The initial state s_0 is the message m itself

  - In round i:

    - g's input is round key k_i and state s_{i-1}
    - g's output is state s_i

  - The ciphertext c is the final state s_{Nr}, where Nr is the number of rounds

  - Decryption algorithm applies g^{-1} iteratively

    - the order of round keys is reversed
    - set $s_{Nr} = c$, compute $s_{i-1} = g^{-1}(k_i, s_i)$

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Another way to realize confusion-diffusion paradigm is through **Feistel** network
  - in Feistel network each state is divided into halves of the same length: L_i and R_i
  - in one round:
    - $L_i = R_{i-1}$
    - $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(k_i, R_{i-1})$

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Are there any advantages over the previous design?
  - operations no longer need to be reversible, as the inverse of the algorithm is not used!
  - reverse one round's computation as $R_{i-1} = L_i$ and $L_{i-1} = R_i \oplus f(k_i, R_{i-1})$

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- In both types of networks, the substitution and permutation algorithms must be carefully designed
  - choosing random substitution/permutation strategies leads to significantly weaker ciphers
  - each bit difference in S-box input creates at least 2-bit difference in its output
  - mixing permutation ensures that difference in one S-box propagates to at least 2 S-boxes in next round

Block Ciphers

- Larger key size means greater security

  - for n-bit keys, brute force search takes $2^n/2$ time on average

  - More rounds often provide better protection

    - the number of rounds must be large enough for proper mixing

  - Larger block size offers increased security

    - security of a cipher also depends on the block length

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- In 1973 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a solicitation for cryptosystems

- DES was developed by IBM and adopted as a standard in 1977

- It was expected to be used as a standard for 10–15 years

- Was replaced only in 2001 with AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- DES characteristics:

  - key size is 56 bits

  - block size is 64 bits

  - number of rounds is 16

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- DES uses Feistel network

  - Feistel network is used in many block ciphers such as DES, RC5, etc.

  - not used in AES

  - in DES, each Li and Ri is 32 bits long; ki is 48 bits long

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- DES has a fixed initial permutation IP prior to 16 rounds of encryption
  - The inverse permutation IP^{-1} is applied at the end

DES f function

32 bits R_{i-1}

E

48 bits

k_i

48 bits

48 bits

6 bits

S_1 $\cdots$ S_8

4 bits

$\cdots$

32 bits

P

32 bits

- The f function f(ki, Ri−1)
  - first expands Ri−1 from 32 to 48 bits (ki is 48 bits long)
  - XORs expanded Ri−1 with ki
  - applies substitution to the result using S-boxes
  - and finally permutes the value

DES

- There are 8 S-boxes

  - S-boxes are the only non-linear elements in DES design

  - they are crucial for the security of the cipher

- Example S1

14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7
0	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8
4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	0
15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	13

input to each S-box is 6 bits b1b2b3b4b5b6

- row = b1b6, column = b2b3b4b5

- output is 4 bits

DES

More about S-boxes..

- a modified version of IBM's proposal was accepted as the standard
- some of the design choices of S-boxes weren't public, which triggered criticism
- in late 1980s – early 1990s differential cryptanalysis techniques were discovered
- it was then revealed that DES S-boxes were designed to prevent such attacks
- such cryptanalysis techniques were known almost 20 years before they were discovered by others

DES Key Schedule

- Key computation consists of:
  - circular shift
  - permutation
  - contraction

DES Weak Keys

- The master key *k* is used to generate 16 round keys

- Some keys result in the same round key to be generated in more than one round

  - this reduces complexity of the cipher

- Solution: check for weak keys at key generation

- DES has 4 weak keys:

  - 0000000 0000000

  - 0000000 FFFFFFF

  - FFFFFFF 0000000

  - FFFFFFF FFFFFFF

Attacks on DES

- Brute force attack: try all possible 2^{56} keys
  - time-consuming, but no storage requirements
- Differential cryptanalysis: traces the difference of two messages through each round of the algorithm
  - was discovered in early 90s
  - not effective against DES
- Linear cryptanalysis: tries to find linear approximations to describe DES transformations
  - was discovered in 1993
  - has no practical implication

Brute Force Search Attacks on DES

- It was conjectured in 1970s that a cracker machine could be built for $20 million

- In 1990s RSA Laboratories called several DES challenges
  - Challenge II-2 was solved in 1998 by Electronic Frontier Foundation
    - a DES Cracker machine was built for less than $250,000 and found the key was in 56 hours
  - Challenge III was solved in 1999 by the DES Cracker in cooperation with a worldwide network of 100,000 computers
    - the key was found in 22 hours 15 minutes
    - http://www.distributed.net/des

Increasing Security of DES

- DES uses a 56-bit key and this raised concerns
- One proposed solution is double DES
  - apply DES twice by using two different keys k1 and k2
  - encryption $c = E_{k2}(E_{k1}(m))$
  - decryption $m = D_{k1}(D_{k2}(c))$
- The resulting key is $2 \cdot 56 = 112$ bits, so it should be more secure, right?
  - an attack called meet-in-the-middle discovers keys k1 and k2 with 2^{56} computation and storage
  - better, but not substantially than regular DES

Triple DES

- Triple DES with two keys k1 and k2:

  - encryption $c = E_{k1}(D_{k2}(E_{k1}(m)))$

  - decryption $m = D_{k1}(E_{k2}(D_{k1}(c)))$

  - key space is $2 \cdot 56 = 112$ bits

- Triple DES with three keys k1, k2, and k3:

  - encryption $c = E_{k3}(D_{k2}(E_{k1}(m)))$

  - decryption $m = D_{k1}(E_{k2}(D_{k3}(c)))$

  - key space is $3 \cdot 56 = 168$ bits

- There is no known practical attack against either version

- Can be made backward compatible by setting k1 = k2 or k3 = k2

Summary of Attacks on DES

- DES – best attack: brute force search
  - 2^{55} work on average
  - no other requirements
- Double DES
  - best attack: meet-in-the-middle
  - requires 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs
  - requires 2^{56} space and about 2^{56} work
- Triple DES
  - best practical attack: brute force search

Symmetric Encryption

- So far we've covered:

  - what secure symmetric encryption is

  - high-level design of block ciphers

  - DES

- Next, we'll talk about:

  - AES

  - block cipher encryption modes

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- In 1997 NIST made a formal call for an unclassified publicly disclosed encryption algorithm available worldwide and royalty-free
  - the goal was to replace DES with a new standard called AES
  - the algorithm must be a symmetric block cipher
  - the algorithm must support (at a minimum) 128-bit blocks and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits
- The evaluation criteria were:
  - security
  - speed and memory requirements
 - algorithm and implementation characteristics

AES

- During encryption:
  - the block is copied into the state matrix
  - the state is modified at each round of encryption and decryption
  - the final state is copied to the ciphertext

in_0	in_4	in_8	in_{12}
in_1	in_5	in_9	in_{13}
in_2	in_6	in_{10}	in_{14}
in_3	in_7	in_{11}	in_{15}

$\longrightarrow$

$s_{0,0}$	$s_{0,1}$	$s_{0,2}$	$s_{0,3}$
$s_{1,0}$	$s_{1,1}$	$s_{1,2}$	$s_{1,3}$
$s_{2,0}$	$s_{2,1}$	$s_{2,2}$	$s_{2,3}$
$s_{3,0}$	$s_{3,1}$	$s_{3,2}$	$s_{3,3}$

$\dashrightarrow$

$s_{0,0}$	$s_{0,1}$	$s_{0,2}$	$s_{0,3}$
$s_{1,0}$	$s_{1,1}$	$s_{1,2}$	$s_{1,3}$
$s_{2,0}$	$s_{2,1}$	$s_{2,2}$	$s_{2,3}$
$s_{3,0}$	$s_{3,1}$	$s_{3,2}$	$s_{3,3}$

$\longrightarrow$

out_0	out_4	out_8	out_{12}
out_1	out_5	out_9	out_{13}
out_2	out_6	out_{10}	out_{14}
out_3	out_7	out_{11}	out_{15}

AES

- The key schedule in AES:
  - the key is treated as a 4 × 4 matrix as well
  - the key is then expanded into an array of words
  - each word is 4 bytes and there are 44 words (for 128-bit key)
  - four distinct words serve as a round key for each round

k_0	k_4	k_8	k_{12}
k_1	k_5	k_9	k_{13}
k_2	k_6	k_{10}	k_{14}
k_3	k_7	k_{11}	k_{15}

$\longrightarrow$

w_0	w_1	$\bullet \ \bullet \ \bullet$	w_{42}	w_{43}

AES

- Rijndael doesn't have a Feistel structure

  - 2 out of 5 AES candidates (including Rijndael) don't use Feistel structure

  - they process the entire block in parallel during each round

- The operations are (3 substitution and 1 permutation operations):

  - SUBBYTES: byte-by-byte substitution using an S-box

  - SHIFTROWS: a simple permutation

  - MIXCOLUMNS: a substitution using *mod 28* arithmetics

  - ADDROUNDKEY: a simple XOR of the current state with a portion of the expanded key

AES

- At a high-level, encryption proceeds as follows:
    - set initial state $s_0 = m$
    - perform operation ADDROUNDKEY (XORs $\boldsymbol{k}_i$ and $\boldsymbol{s}_i$)
    - for each of the first $Nr - 1$ rounds:
        - perform a substitution operation SUBBYTES on $\boldsymbol{s}_i$ and an S-box
        - perform a permutation SHIFTROWS on $\boldsymbol{s}_i$
        - perform an operation MIXCOLUMNS on $\boldsymbol{s}_i$
        - perform ADDROUNDKEY
    - the last round is the same except no MIXCOLUMNS is used
    - set the ciphertext $c = s_{Nr}$

AES

- More about Rijndael design. . .

  - ADDROUNDKEY is the only operation that uses key

    - that's why it is applied at the beginning and at the end

- all operations are reversible

- the decryption algorithm uses the expanded key in the reverse order

- the decryption algorithm, however, is not identical to the encryption algorithm

AES

- The SUBBYTES operation

  ○ maps a state byte $s_{i,j}$ to a new byte $s'_{i,j}$ using S-box

  ○ the S-box is a 16 × 16 matrix with a byte in each position

    ■ the S-box contains a permutation of all possible 256 8-bit values

    ■ the values are computed using a formula

    ■ it was designed to resist known cryptanalytic attacks (i.e., to have low correlation between input bits and output bits)

AES

- The SUBBYTES operation
  - to compute the new $s'_{i,j}$:
    - set x to the 4 leftmost bits of $s_{i,j}$ and y to its 4 rightmost bits
    - use x as the row and y as the column to locate a cell in the S-box
    - use that cell value as $s'_{i,j}$

  - the same procedure is performed on each byte of the state

AES

- The SHIFTROWS operation

  - performs circular left shift on state rows

    - 2nd row is shifted by 1 byte

    - 3rd row is shifted by 2 bytes

    - 4th row is shifted by 3 bytes

$s_{0,0}$	$s_{0,1}$	$s_{0,2}$	$s_{0,3}$
$s_{1,0}$	$s_{1,1}$	$s_{1,2}$	$s_{1,3}$
$s_{2,0}$	$s_{2,1}$	$s_{2,2}$	$s_{2,3}$
$s_{3,0}$	$s_{3,1}$	$s_{3,2}$	$s_{3,3}$

$\longrightarrow$

$s_{0,0}$	$s_{0,1}$	$s_{0,2}$	$s_{0,3}$
$s_{1,1}$	$s_{1,2}$	$s_{1,3}$	$s_{1,0}$
$s_{2,2}$	$s_{2,3}$	$s_{2,0}$	$s_{2,1}$
$s_{3,3}$	$s_{3,0}$	$s_{3,1}$	$s_{3,2}$

  - important because other operations operate on a single cell

AES

- The MixColumns operation

  - multiplies the state by a fixed matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\ s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\ s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\ s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} & s'_{0,2} & s'_{0,3} \\ s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1} & s'_{1,2} & s'_{1,3} \\ s'_{2,0} & s'_{2,1} & s'_{2,2} & s'_{2,3} \\ s'_{3,0} & s'_{3,1} & s'_{3,2} & s'_{3,3} \end{bmatrix}$$

  - was designed to ensure good mixing among the bytes of each column

  - the coefficients 01, 02, and 03 are for implementation purposes

    (multiplication involves at most a shift and an XOR)

AES

- Decryption:
  - inverse S-box is used in SUBBYTES
  - inverse shifts are performed in SHIFTROWS
  - inverse multiplication matrix is used in MIXCOLUMNS

- Key expansion:
  - was designed to resist known attacks and be efficient
  - knowledge of a part of the key or round key doesn't enable calculation of other key bits
  - round-dependent values are used in key expansion

AES

- Summary of Rijndael design
  - simple design but resistant to known attacks
  - very efficient on a variety of platforms including 8-bit and 64-bit platforms
  - highly parallelizable
  - had the highest throughput in hardware among all AES candidates
  - well suited for restricted-space environments (very low RAM and ROM requirements)
  - optimized for encryption (decryption is slower)

AES Hardware Implementation

- It's been long known that hardware implementations of AES are extremely fast
    - the speed of encryption is compared with the speed of disk read
- Hardware implementations however remained inaccessible to the average user
- Recently Intel introduced new AES instruction set (AES-NI) in its commodity processors
    - other processor manufacturers support it now as well
    - hardware acceleration can be easily used on many platforms

Secure Encryption

- For symmetric encryption to be secure, the key must be chosen completely at random
  - cryptography failures are often due to incorrect implementations
- Using a strong block cipher is not enough for secure encryption!
  - if you need to send more than 1 block (i.e., 16 bytes) over the key lifetime, applying plain block cipher to the message as will fail even weak definitions of secure encryption

    Enck(b1), Enck(b2), . . .

  - no deterministic encryption can be secure if multiple blocks are sent

Block Cipher Limitation

- Block length is fixed (n-bit)

- Need to Partition into n-bit blocks to encrypt large messages

Block Cipher Limitation

- Does not hide data patterns, unsuitable for long messages

- Susceptible to replay attacks

    - Example: a wired transfer transaction can be replayed by resending the original message)

Encryption Modes

- Encryption modes indicate how messages longer than one block are encrypted and decrypted
- 4 modes of operation were standardized in 1980 for Digital Encryption Standard (DES)
  - can be used with any block cipher
  - electronic codebook mode (ECB), cipher feedback mode (CFB), cipher block chaining mode (CBC), and output feedback mode (OFB)
- 5 modes were specified with the current standard Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001
  - the 4 above and counter mode

Encryption Modes

- **Electronic Codebook (ECB)** mode

  - divide the message m into blocks $m_1 m_2 \ldots m_\ell$ of size n each

  - encipher each block separately: for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$, $ci = E_k(m_i)$, where E denotes block cipher encryption

  - the resulting ciphertext is $c = c_1 c_2 \ldots c\ell$

Encryption Modes

- Properties of ECB mode:
  - identical plaintext blocks result in identical ciphertexts (under the same key)
  - each block can be encrypted and decrypted independently
  - this mode doesn't result in secure encryption

- ECB mode is a plain invocation of the block cipher
  - it allows the block cipher to be used in other, more complex cryptographic constructions

Encryption Modes

- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
  - set $c_0 = IV \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^n$ (initialization vector)

  - encryption: for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$, $c_i = E_k(m_i \oplus c_{i-1})$

  - decryption: for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$, $m_i = c_{i-1} \oplus D_k(c_i)$, where D is block cipher decryption

Encryption Modes

- Properties of CBC mode:

    - this mode is CPA-secure (has a formal proof) if the block cipher can be

      assumed to produce pseudo random output

    - a ciphertext block depends on all preceding plaintext blocks

    - sequential encryption, cannot use parallel hardware

    - *IV* must be random and communicated intact

        - if the IV is not random, security quickly degrades

        - if someone can fool the receiver into using a different IV, security issues arise

Encryption Modes

- Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode

  - the message is XORed with the encryption of the feedback from the previous block

  - generate random IV and set initial input $I_1 = IV$

  - encryption: $c_i = E_k(I_i) \oplus m_i; I_{i+1} = c_i$

 - decryption: $m_i = c_i \oplus E_k(I_i)$

Encryption Modes

- This mode allows the block cipher to be used as a stream cipher

  - if our application requires that plaintext units shorter than the block are

    transmitted without delay, we can use this mode

  - the message is transmitted in r-bit units (r is often 8 or 1)

Encryption Modes

- Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode:

    ○ input: key k, r-bit plaintext blocks $m_1, \ldots$

   ○ output: n-bit IV, r-bit ciphertext blocks $c_1, \ldots$

Encryption Modes

- Properties of CFB mode:

  - the mode is CPA-secure (under the same assumption that the block cipher is strong)

  - similar to CBC, a ciphertext block depends on all previous plaintext blocks

  - throughput is decreased when the mode is used on small units

  - one encryption operation is applied per r bits, not per n bits

Encryption Modes

- Output Feedback (OFB) mode:

  ○ similar to CFB, but the feedback is from encryption output and is

  independent of the message

Encryption Modes

- Output Feedback (OFB) mode:
  - n-bit feedback is recommended
  - using fewer bits for the feedback reduces the size of the cycle

- Properties of OFB:
  - the mode is CPA-secure
  - the key stream is plaintext-independent
  - similar to CFB, throughput is decreased for $r < n$, but the key stream can be precomputed

Encryption Modes

- Counter (CRT) mode:

  - a counter is encrypted and XORed with a plaintext block

  - no feedback into the encryption function

    - initially set $ctr = IV \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^n$

ctr	ctr+1	ctr+2

$$k \longrightarrow \boxed{E_k} \qquad k \longrightarrow \boxed{E_k} \qquad \cdots$$

$$m_1 \longrightarrow \oplus \qquad m_2 \longrightarrow \oplus$$

$$c_0 \qquad\qquad c_1 \qquad\qquad c_2$$

Encryption Modes

- Counter (CRT) mode:

    - encryption: for $i = 1, . . ., \ell, c_i = E_k(ctr + i) \oplus m_i$

    - decryption: for $i = 1, . . ., \ell, m_i = E_k(ctr + i) \oplus c_i$

- Properties:

    - there is no need to pad the last block to full block size

    - if the last plaintext block is incomplete, we just truncate the last cipher

      block and transmit it

Encryption Modes

- Advantages of counter mode

    - Hardware and software efficiency: multiple blocks can be encrypted or decrypted in parallel

    - Preprocessing: encryption can be done in advance; the rest is only XOR

    - Random access: ith block of plaintext or ciphertext can be processed independently of others

    - Security: at least as secure as other modes (i.e., CPA-secure)

    - Simplicity: doesn't require decryption or decryption key scheduling

- But what happens if the counter is reused?

Summary

- AES is the current block cipher standard

  - it offers strong security and fast performance

- Five encryption modes are specified as part of the standard

  - ECB mode is not for secure encryption

  - any other encryption mode achieves sufficient security

    - use one of these modes for encryption even if the message is a single block

- Strong randomness is required for cryptographic purposes

  - key generation, IV generation, etc.