CSE 610 Special Topics:
System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries

Instructor: Dr. Ziming Zhao

Location: Frnczk 408, North campus
Time: Monday, 5:20 PM - 8:10 PM

Last Class

1. Defenses
    a. Direct defense
    b. Stack Cookie; Canary - How to bypass
    c. Shadow stack

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SoK: Shining Light on Shadow Stacks

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***Abstract*—Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations.**

We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadesmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and Shadesmar's deployability. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios.

(ROP) [10], [11], [12], are a significant problem in practice, and will only increase in frequency. In the last year, Google's Project Zero has published exploits against Android libraries, trusted execution environments, and Windows device drivers [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. These exploits use arbitrary write primitives to overwrite return addresses, leading to privilege escalation in the form of arbitrary execution in user space or root privileges. The widespread adoption of CFI increases the difficulty for attacks on forward edge code pointers. Consequently, attackers will increasingly focus on the easier target, backward edges.

C / C++ applications are fundamentally vulnerable to ROP style attacks for two reasons: (i) the languages provide neither memory nor type safety, and (ii) the implementation of the call-return abstraction relies on storing values in writeable memory. In the absence of memory or type safety, an attacker may corrupt *any* memory location that is writeable. Consider, for the sake of exposition, x86_64 machine code where the call-return abstraction is implemented by pushing the address

This Class

1. Defenses
    a. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

Seccomp

Defense-4:
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

ASLR History

2001 - Linux PaX patch
2003 - OpenBSD
2005 - Linux 2.6.12 user-space
2007 - Windows Vista kernel and user-space
2011 - iOS 5 user-space
2011 - Android 4.0 ICS user-space
2012 - OS X 10.8 kernel-space
2012 - iOS 6 kernel-space
2014 - Linux 3.14 kernel-space

Not supported well in embedded devices.

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

Attackers need to know which address to control (jump/overwrite)

- Stack - shellcode
- Library - system()

Defense: let’s randomize it!

- Attackers do not know where to jump...

Position Independent Executable (PIE)

Position-independent code (PIC) or position-independent executable (PIE) is a body of machine code that executes properly regardless of its absolute address.

Process Address Space in General



Traditional Process Address Space - Static Program



Traditional Process Address Space - Static Program w/shared Libs



ASLR Process Address Space - w/o PIE



ASLR Process Address Space - PIE



code/aslr1

```
int k = 50;
int l;
char *p = "hello world";

int add(int a, int b)
{
        int i = 10;
        i = a + b;
        printf("The address of i is %p\n", &i);

        return i;
}

int sub(int d, int c)
{
        int j = 20;
        j = d - c;
        printf("The address of j is %p\n", &j);

        return j;
}

int compute(int a, int b, int c)
{
        return sub(add(a, b), c) * k;
}
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        printf("===== Libc function addresses =====\n");
        printf("The address of printf is %p\n", printf);
        printf("The address of memcpy is %p\n", memcpy);
        printf("The distance between printf and memcpy is %x\n", (int)printf - (int)memcpy);
        printf("The address of system is %p\n", system);
        printf("The distance between printf and system is %x\n", (int)printf - (int)system);
        printf("===== Module function addresses =====\n");
        printf("The address of main is %p\n", main);
        printf("The address of add is %p\n", add);
        printf("The distance between main and add is %x\n", (int)main - (int)add);
        printf("The address of sub is %p\n", sub);
        printf("The distance between main and sub is %x\n", (int)main - (int)sub);
        printf("The address of compute is %p\n", compute);
        printf("The distance between main and compute is %x\n", (int)main - (int)compute);

        printf("===== Global initialized variable addresses =====\n");
        printf("The address of k is %p\n", &k);
        printf("The address of p is %p\n", p);
        printf("The distance between k and p is %x\n", (int)&k - (int)p);

        printf("===== Global uninitialized variable addresses =====\n");
        printf("The address of l is %p\n", &l);
        printf("The distance between k and l is %x\n", (int)&k - (int)l);

        printf("===== Local variable addresses =====\n");
        return compute(9, 6, 4);
}
```

Check the symbols

nm | sort

```
00001000 t _init
000010c0 T _start
00001100 T __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx
00001110 t deregister_tm_clones
00001150 t register_tm_clones
000011a0 t __do_global_dtors_aux
000011f0 t frame_dummy
000011f9 T __x86.get_pc_thunk.dx
000011fd T add
00001261 T sub
000012c3 T compute
00001307 T main
0000158d T __x86.get_pc_thunk.ax
000015a0 T __libc_csu_init
00001610 T __libc_csu_fini
00001615 T __x86.get_pc_thunk.bp
00001620 T __stack_chk_fail_local
00001638 T _fini
00002000 R _fp_hw
00002004 R _IO_stdin_used
00002358 r __GNU_EH_FRAME_HDR
0000258c r __FRAME_END__
00003ec8 d __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
00003ec8 d __init_array_start
00003ecc d __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
00003ecc d __init_array_end
00003ed0 d _DYNAMIC
00003fc8 d _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
00004000 D __data_start
00004000 W data_start
00004004 D __dso_handle
00004008 D k
0000400c D p
00004010 B __bss_start
00004010 b completed.7621
00004010 D _edata
00004010 D __TMC_END__
00004014 B l
00004018 B _end
         U __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.0
         U memcpy@@GLIBC_2.0
         U printf@@GLIBC_2.0
         U puts@@GLIBC_2.0
         U __stack_chk_fail@@GLIBC_2.4
         U system@@GLIBC_2.0
         w __cxa_finalize@@GLIBC_2.1.3
         w __gmon_start__
         w _ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
         w _ITM_registerTMCloneTable
```

```
0000000000001000 t _init
0000000000001090 T _start
00000000000010c0 t deregister_tm_clones
00000000000010f0 t register_tm_clones
0000000000001130 t __do_global_dtors_aux
0000000000001170 t frame_dummy
0000000000001179 T add
00000000000011dd T sub
000000000000123f T compute
000000000000127c T main
00000000000014f0 T __libc_csu_init
0000000000001560 T __libc_csu_fini
0000000000001568 T _fini
0000000000002000 R _IO_stdin_used
0000000000002378 r __GNU_EH_FRAME_HDR
000000000000253c r __FRAME_END__
0000000000003d98 d __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
0000000000003d98 d __init_array_start
0000000000003da0 d __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
0000000000003da0 d __init_array_end
0000000000003da8 d _DYNAMIC
0000000000003f98 d _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
0000000000004000 D __data_start
0000000000004000 W data_start
0000000000004008 D __dso_handle
0000000000004010 D k
0000000000004018 D p
0000000000004020 B __bss_start
0000000000004020 b completed.8059
0000000000004020 D _edata
0000000000004020 D __TMC_END__
0000000000004024 B l
0000000000004028 B _end
                 U __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.2.5
                 U memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14
                 U printf@@GLIBC_2.2.5
                 U puts@@GLIBC_2.2.5
                 U __stack_chk_fail@@GLIBC_2.4
                 U system@@GLIBC_2.2.5
                 w __cxa_finalize@@GLIBC_2.2.5
                 w __gmon_start__
                 w _ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
                 w _ITM_registerTMCloneTable
```

Position Independent Executable (PIE)



x86 Instruction Set Reference

CALL

Call Procedure

Opcode	Mnemonic	Description
E8 cw	CALL rel16	Call near, relative, displacement relative to next instruction
E8 cd	CALL rel32	Call near, relative, displacement relative to next instruction
FF /2	CALL r/m16	Call near, absolute indirect, address given in r/m16
FF /2	CALL r/m32	Call near, absolute indirect, address given in r/m32
9A cd	CALL ptr16:16	Call far, absolute, address given in operand
9A cp	CALL ptr16:32	Call far, absolute, address given in operand
FF /3	CALL m16:16	Call far, absolute indirect, address given in m16:16
FF /3	CALL m16:32	Call far, absolute indirect, address given in m16:32

Description

Saves procedure linking information on the stack and branches to the procedure (called procedure) specified with the destination (target) operand. The target operand specifies the address of the first instruction in the called procedure. This operand can be an immediate value, a generalpurpose register, or a memory location.

This instruction can be used to execute four different types of calls:

Near call
A call to a procedure within the current code segment (the segment currently pointed to by the CS register), sometimes referred to as an intrasegment call.
Far call
A call to a procedure located in a different segment than the current code segment, sometimes referred to as an intersegment call.
Inter-privilege-level far call
A far call to a procedure in a segment at a different privilege level than that of the currently executing program or procedure.
Task switch
A call to a procedure located in a different task.

The latter two call types (inter-privilege-level call and task switch) can only be executed in protected mode. See the section titled "Calling Procedures Using Call and RET" in Chapter 6 of the IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual, Volume 1, for additional information on near, far, and inter-privilege-level calls. See Chapter 6, Task Management, in the IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual, Volume 3, for information on performing task switches with the CALL instruction.

Near Call

PIE Overhead

- <1% in 64 bit

Access all strings via relative address from current %rip
lea 0x23423(%rip), %rdi

- ~3% in 32 bit

Cannot address using %eip
Call __86.get_pc_thunk.xx functions

Temporarily enable and disable ASLR

Disable:

```
echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
```

Enable:

```
echo 2 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
```

ASLR Enabled; PIE; 32 bit

```
ziming@ziming-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries UB 2020/code/aslr1$ ./aslr1
===== Libc function addresses =====
The address of printf is 0xf7d57340
The address of memcpy is 0xf7e55d00
The distance between printf and memcpy is fff01640
The address of system is 0xf7d48830
The distance between printf and system is eb10
===== Module function addresses =====
The address of main is 0x565a32ad
The address of add is 0x565a31dd
The distance between main and add is d0
The address of sub is 0x565a3224
The distance between main and sub is 89
The address of compute is 0x565a3269
The distance between main and compute is 44
The distance between main and printf is 5e84bf6d
The distance between main and memcpy is 5e74d5ad
===== Global initialized variable addresses =====
The address of k is 0x565a6008
The address of p is 0x565a4008
The distance between k and p is 2000
The distance between k and main is 2d5b
The distance between k and memcpy is 5e750308
===== Global uninitialized variable addresses =====
The address of l is 0x565a6014
The distance between k and l is 565a6008
===== Local variable addresses =====
The address of i is 0xfff270bc
The address of j is 0xfff270bc
ziming@ziming-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries UB 2020/code/aslr1$ ./aslr1
===== Libc function addresses =====
The address of printf is 0xf7ded340
The address of memcpy is 0xf7eebd00
The distance between printf and memcpy is fff01640
The address of system is 0xf7dde830
The distance between printf and system is eb10
===== Module function addresses =====
The address of main is 0x565892ad
The address of add is 0x565891dd
The distance between main and add is d0
The address of sub is 0x56589224
The distance between main and sub is 89
The address of compute is 0x56589269
The distance between main and compute is 44
The distance between main and printf is 5e79bf6d
The distance between main and memcpy is 5e69d5ad
===== Global initialized variable addresses =====
The address of k is 0x5658c008
The address of p is 0x5658a008
The distance between k and p is 2000
The distance between k and main is 2d5b
The distance between k and memcpy is 5e6a0308
===== Global uninitialized variable addresses =====
The address of l is 0x5658c014
The distance between k and l is 5658c008
===== Local variable addresses =====
The address of i is 0xffe1175c
The address of j is 0xffe1175c
```

ASLR Enabled; PIE; 64 bit

```
ziming@ziming-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries UB 2020/code/aslr1$ ./aslr164
===== Libc function addresses =====
The address of printf is 0x7f1174903e10
The address of memcpy is 0x7f1174a2d670
The distance between printf and memcpy is ffed67a0
The address of system is 0x7f11748f4410
The distance between printf and system is fa00
===== Module function addresses =====
The address of main is 0x55d4942af216
The address of add is 0x55d4942af159
The distance between main and add is bd
The address of sub is 0x55d4942af19a
The distance between main and sub is 7c
The address of compute is 0x55d4942af1d9
The distance between main and compute is 3d
The distance between main and printf is 1f9ab406
The distance between main and memcpy is 1f881ba6
===== Global initialized variable addresses =====
The address of k is 0x55d4942b2010
The address of p is 0x55d4942b0008
The distance between k and p is 2008
The distance between k and main is 2dfa
The distance between k and memcpy is 1f8849a0
===== Global uninitialized variable addresses =====
The address of l is 0x55d4942b2024
The distance between k and l is 942b2010
===== Local variable addresses =====
The address of i is 0x7ffc65ad48ac
The address of j is 0x7ffc65ad48ac
ziming@ziming-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries UB 2020/code/aslr1$ ./aslr164
===== Libc function addresses =====
The address of printf is 0x7f0af8132e10
The address of memcpy is 0x7f0af825c670
The distance between printf and memcpy is ffed67a0
The address of system is 0x7f0af8123410
The distance between printf and system is fa00
===== Module function addresses =====
The address of main is 0x5579ce78d216
The address of add is 0x5579ce78d159
The distance between main and add is bd
The address of sub is 0x5579ce78d19a
The distance between main and sub is 7c
The address of compute is 0x5579ce78d1d9
The distance between main and compute is 3d
The distance between main and printf is d665a406
The distance between main and memcpy is d6530ba6
===== Global initialized variable addresses =====
The address of k is 0x5579ce790010
The address of p is 0x5579ce78e008
The distance between k and p is 2008
The distance between k and main is 2dfa
The distance between k and memcpy is d65339a0
===== Global uninitialized variable addresses =====
The address of l is 0x5579ce790024
The distance between k and l is ce790010
===== Local variable addresses =====
The address of i is 0x7ffed9e3c61c
The address of j is 0x7ffed9e3c61c
```

Bypass ASLR

- Address leak: certain vulnerabilities allow attackers to obtain the addresses required for an attack, which enables bypassing ASLR.
- Relative addressing: some vulnerabilities allow attackers to obtain access to data relative to a particular address, thus bypassing ASLR.
- Implementation weaknesses: some vulnerabilities allow attackers to guess addresses due to low entropy or faults in a particular ASLR implementation.
- Side channels of hardware operation: certain properties of processor operation may allow bypassing ASLR.

code/aslr2 with ASLR

```
int printsecret()
{
        printf("This is the secret...\n");

        return 0;
}

int vulfoo()
{
        printf("vulfoo is at %p \n", vulfoo);
        char buf[8];
        gets(buf);

        return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        vulfoo();
        return 0;
}
```

Secure Computing Mode (Seccomp)

Seccomp - A system call firewall

seccomp allows developers to write complex rules to:

- allow certain system calls
- disallow certain system calls
- filter allowed and disallowed system calls based on argument variables

seccomp rules are inherited by children!

These rules can be quite complex (see http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/seccomp_rule_add.3.html).

History of seccomp

2005 - seccomp was first devised by Andrea Arcangeli for use in public grid computing and was originally intended as a means of safely running untrusted compute-bound programs.

2005 - Merged into the Linux kernel mainline in kernel version 2.6.12, which was released on March 8, 2005.

2017 - Android uses a seccomp-bpf filter in the zygote since Android 8.0 Oreo.